

INTERIM NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUG ABUSE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION


ON

EXAMINING NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGIES, FOCUSING ON
METHODS FOR BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUG ABUSE

OCTOBER 20, 1993

Serial No. J-103-32

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1995

86-836 CC

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-046625-3

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INTERIM NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUG ABUSE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1993

**U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
*Washington, DC.***

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:39 a.m., in room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., chairman of the committee, presiding.

Also present: Senators DeConcini, Feinstein, Hatch, Grassley, Specter, and Cohen.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. The reason we have not started at 10:30 is there was a vote scheduled to begin at 10:30. It has now just begun, and although Director Brown is here and has been here, I am not going to bring him out until we have a quorum here, which will not occur for another 10 or 12 minutes because members are voting on the floor of the Senate as I speak.

So for the benefit of those who are either having to carry this on television or those of you who have other plans, we will begin this hearing with Director Brown at 10:50. By that time, the vote will have been completed, and we will follow through. There will be another vote at 11:30, but we will try to stagger the membership leaving so that we can continue the process without interruption.

We will recess until 10:50.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. We have a somewhat unexpected pleasure, but a pleasure nonetheless. One of our colleagues who has worked very closely with Senator Hatch and I on crime and drug legislation over the years from the House, Congressman Schumer from New York, is here this morning, and he has asked, and we are delighted to accede to his request, to make a short 5-minute statement on the matter that is before us today.

We welcome you, Congressman. We are happy to have you here and the floor is yours, and then the Senator and I will make our opening statements, and then we will invite Director Brown to come forward.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. SCHUMER. Well, I thank you, Senator Biden, not only for allowing us here to testify, but also for your leadership on this issue, and Senator Hatch has always been gracious and a gentleman. We disagree, but we have tremendous respect for each other's views on these issues, and occasionally we agree, actually.

Senator HATCH. Actually, we agree quite often.

Mr. SCHUMER. Right. Anyway, I want to thank you for letting me testify here today before your committee and talking about the national drug control strategy. I also want to thank Director Brown, who spent a nice amount of time and did a wonderful job in our city in terms of the community policing part of the crime bill, which is not before us today but is something that is a beacon.

What I would like to say to you, gentlemen, and to Mr. Brown is that, first, the war on drugs is and should be a major priority. We all know the problem is actually getting worse in our cities. It may be getting better elsewhere, but it is getting worse in our cities, and the crime and social malaise and just the human detritus, the wasted people who might be out there helping America who are not there, make it imperative that we act.

Now, I would like to just make three quick points. The first is—and these are related to the summit on drugs that I held as chairman of the crime committee last year. The first is that we would all like the budget on the war on drugs to increase. We know realistically that if it does increase, it won't increase by very much, given our budget deficit, so we have to look for ways to spend the dollars more efficiently.

I think two consensuses are emerging that blend into one another, but they both lead to a third point where we need your help and the administration's help. The first point is that if there is one area in the \$13.1 billion war on drugs that doesn't work, it is in the interdiction side. The money that goes to the Defense Department and the Coast Guard—last year, \$2.1 billion to intercept drugs coming across the border—the bang for the buck we get in that is awful. Some parts of it do work. When the AWACS and the Coast Guard follow tips, they sometimes land a big amount of drugs. But when they just patrol around looking for stuff, they bring in almost nothing.

So at our summit on drugs, we found that there was a broad consensus that while certain interdiction policies work—the DEA's program in Colombia to knock off the drug kingpins worked—this didn't. So there is \$2.1 billion that I think is not wisely spent, at least some of it.

On the other hand, we reached another consensus on the other side, and that is treatment. We are getting much more focused on what kinds of treatment work, and treatment, in particular, associated with the criminal justice system. The mandatory drug treatment in the prisons that you, Senator Biden, and I have put in the crime bill, the kind of alternatives to incarceration that require treatment, all are remarkably effective both in terms of dollars and results, and the reason is simple.

With the coercive aspects of the criminal justice system, those who wish to undergo treatment, particularly therapeutic treatment, push forward with it. We have in my district the Coney Island Hospital treatment facility. It is a residential facility. It is an average, not better, not worse. Only about 3 out of every 100 people who start going through it end up finishing.

You take that same facility and you say that if you go through this, you will get out of jail a little sooner or you won't have to go to jail, and the numbers skyrocket to 50 or 60 percent who can actually succeed. So treatment in the system works.

Our dilemma in both the House and the Senate is how to take some of the dollars out of the interdiction area and put it into the treatment area, and this is where I think we could follow up on the wonderful and the good report that Secretary Brown has offered. We need help to do that.

Because of our budget rules in the House, and I believe in the Senate, if we were to take \$400 million out of the defense budget for drug interdiction, because that money is in the defense budget, that money would either go, at best, to deficit reduction and, at worst, at least in my opinion, to build another aircraft carrier. It would not be allowed to actually be used for treatment and the overall pool of money in the war on drugs would decline.

So what I am urging as the next step to be taken is that when the administration submits its budget next year that they actually look at the pie of drug money and if they agree, as the report seems to, that certain areas of interdiction don't work and certain areas of treatment need to be more funded, they change those numbers at the executive level because we cannot do it in Congress without the executive budget being submitted that way, and then we together work on making sure that those numbers are realized.

That is my simple point. I think that, you know, just saying we are going to do it—it won't happen unless those budget numbers actually change next year and I hope that that will happen. I want to thank you, Senator, for the opportunity of making that point here today. I come from just a frustrating measure in the House where we did manage to get the interdiction number reduced by \$400 million and the money vanished into the rest of the defense budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you, and I think you would find that the majority of us on this committee share your view. As a matter of fact, in my brief discussion with Director Brown prior to, this hearing I said privately what you have said publicly: that we are going to have to find those portions of the expenditures that are less useful and that are producing fewer results and move them into those areas of the drug strategy which are producing and promise to produce greater results.

But, you know, when we wrote this legislation in the first instance, we hoped we would get to the point where we are trying to figure out what works best and what doesn't work, then jettison what doesn't work, and increase what does work, and try some new things.

So I thank you very much and we all look forward to working with you.

Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

**STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS DeCONCINI, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA**

Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, I know there are no opening statements. If I could just address the Congressman for a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Senator DECONCINI. Congressman Schumer, thank you for your leadership in this area. You and I have so many things in common, as I do with the chairman, but I am a little concerned about what to me appears to be the easy solution—taking money from interdiction. Where do you take it? What interdiction do you stop? Do you stop the effective Southern Command effort that is going on right now—commenced and implemented by General Jaulwan, and hopelessly continued by his successor, in source countries such as Bolivia and Colombia for the first time? I don't know that you should stop that one.

Mr. SCHUMER. I wouldn't.

Senator DECONCINI. Do you stop the southwest border interdiction program because a newspaper in Arizona claims they flew through and didn't get caught, when, in fact, they did? "20/20" did the same thing and they got caught. You know, it really troubles me because it is easy to say take down one of these fences that we have put up because it costs money and they are not making a lot of direct hits.

On the other hand, if you look at the Border Patrol along the southwest border, their interdictions and confiscations are up 3 and 400 percent. So, to me, it is a bit simplistic to say just move \$2 billion. You know, I would rather move \$2 billion from the defense budget.

Mr. SCHUMER. So would I, but our budget numbers aren't allowing us to do that, which is my point.

Senator DECONCINI. I don't want to take issue with you. I just don't want to leave an impression here that this is a simple thing to do. I agree with you that we need more treatment money. I just hate to see us pull down the defenses we have. That is all. Thank you.

Mr. SCHUMER. Senator, all I would say is some of our interdiction programs are very effective and some aren't, and I think we can get some dollars out of the ones that aren't.

Senator DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to get off—

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no. I know this is something you know more about than any of us do because of your longstanding and particular State interest, and I don't want to cut that off. We will have plenty of time to debate this. We should get to the opening statement of the chairman and the ranking member, and then move to the opening statement of—

Senator DECONCINI. I am sorry. I didn't realize you hadn't made your opening statements. I do apologize.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. That is fine. We were accommodating the Congressman for a brief statement.

Mr. SCHUMER. He was being courteous, as he always is.

Senator DECONCINI. That shows how important you are, Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. I know your interest in this. Most of us are talking, I might add, and we can go back to this, about the money in the Defense Department budget that is used for Caribbean interdiction, which is a big number, not the programs you are talking about.

Mr. SCHUMER. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. But we will get back to that. I thank you very much.

Senator HATCH. Thank you.

Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We would invite Director Brown to the table. I will make a brief opening statement, yield to my colleague from Utah, and then we will hear from Director Brown.

Today, we meet to review the administration's 1993 interim drug strategy, titled "Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse." In this document, the administration takes, in my view, a very, very important step, though only the first step, toward a national drug strategy that works better than what is working now.

For the first time, we have an administration strategy that takes on, in my view, the right question: How can we effectively fight hard-core drug addiction. Why is this the right question? Well, hard-core users must be, in my view, our priority because they are the ones committing the crimes and causing much of the violence that now threatens and frightens the living devil out of all Americans.

Previously, much of our national effort was spent trying to reduce casual use of drugs, an important goal and one at which we have succeeded but one that I and many experts in drug policy have long believed should be secondary as opposed to primary.

Without the right focus, despite enormous expenditures—and we have, in fact, spent, \$38.5 billion over the last 4 years in this effort—we have not won any significant progress on the war on drugs. Hard-core drug addiction, drug-fueled crime and violence, and drug supplies have only worsened since the release of the first drug strategy in 1989. Let me repeat again, drug-fueled crime and violence, up, drug supplies, up, since our strategy and \$38.5 billion later.

Today, there are 6 million hard-core addicts in America. Violent, drug-related crime has turned many communities into war zones. We used to use that terminology in the 1970's and 1980's, and it was hyperbole, it was an exaggeration, but now it is not an exaggeration to say some communities are literally war zones.

I spoke with a noted neurosurgeon yesterday, who happened to be the doctor who operated on me. He is the chief of neurosurgery at one of the great hospitals in the country, Strong Memorial Hospital, in Rochester, NY. We were talking about another matter, about a patient he asked me to talk to to try to give some encouragement to. He said he is now involved in dealing with the problem of violence among youth, and I said, how did you get into that, doctor? He said that there are so many traumatic injuries, like gunshot wounds, that he has dealt with as a neurosurgeon—he said, I can't remain silent anymore. He said, in Los Angeles you have

a greater chance of being shot dead than you do being in the 7 percent of the American population who may die from an aneurism. I mean, it is incredible, and so there are war zones.

There is a drug treatment shortfall of 900,000 persons—treatable, hard-core addicts, 900,000 of them. More drugs are entering the Nation now than before the first strategy was released, notwithstanding the successful and Herculean efforts of our Border Patrol and of our interdiction effort. The end result, though, is—there would be more if they weren't there—an increase.

To make a difference in this so-called war, it seems to me—and I am a broken record on this, as you know; when you used to run the New York City Police Department, and then Houston, you have heard me saying it, and I came to you for advice 5 years ago on this and you agreed with this view then. As a matter of fact, I must say I was educated by you on this point.

For a long time, I have been a broken record about having to focus on hard-core drug abuse, and there are three steps which I have long supported that form the basis, as I read your strategy, of the administration's strategy. The first is we must put more police on the street in community policing programs. More police means fewer drug deals, fewer drug-related shootings, and fewer crimes by those supporting hard-core habits.

Community policing programs put officers in the neighborhoods where they can learn where the deals go down and who the dealers are. I might add, in the crime bill we are about to bring up, we provide for 50,000 folks for community policing that the Federal Government will help fund to get into the streets. Close to the source of the problem, these police can be much more effective in preventing a crime from occurring in the first instance. For example, in my home State of Delaware, recent statistics show that drug-related complaints and arrests decreased over time in every neighborhood where community policing was in use—in every neighborhood where it was in use.

Second, we must hold hard-core drug addicts accountable with certain punishment and we must force them into treatment, even if they don't want treatment. Violent offenders belong off the street and in secure prisons. Building more prisons is necessary, but we must also develop a cost-effective alternative sanction for non-violent offenders.

Most importantly, the millions of hard-core drug addicts in our criminal justice system must get treatment, as pointed out by Congressman Schumer. We have a hard-core drug addict population behind bars now receiving no treatment whatsoever, and when we put them out on the street after they serve their time, they are still in an addicted state. You know better than I do, Director, there is not a prison in this country you can't get drugs into fairly easily.

Today, there are 900,000 treatable hard-core addicts that are roaming our streets. Since the first drug strategy, at least 1 million drug-addicted offenders were released from prison without being treated; 1 million drug-addicted offenders sent to jail, served their time, and released with no treatment whatsoever. I don't know what makes us think the mere fact they have been in jail for 1, 3, 5, 7 years and then released, that they walk out of the joint and onto the street not having that habit any longer.

Programs that provide drug treatment in prison substantially reduce the likelihood that an addict will return to drug abuse and crime after release from jail. Treatment is the key to an effective drug strategy, in my view. We must also treat minor drug offenders who, in most States, now are simply released back into the streets. Programs like the Dade County, FL, drug court have successfully encouraged drug-addicted criminals to get treatment and quit their addiction in order to avoid jail. We provide, I might add, in the crime bill for drug courts and alternatives for first-time offenders in that system.

Third, we have to expand enforcement and prevention programs aimed at juveniles before we lose another generation to drugs and violence. Juveniles are particularly susceptible to the lure of gangs and drug traffickers. We must provide secure facilities for violent juveniles, drug treatment for drug abusers, and prevention and education programs that have proven track records for all children at risk.

To accomplish these steps and the other goals of the administration's strategy we have to allocate our resources wisely. We must take a hard look at what works and what doesn't and put our money where it works. This is the next step the administration, in my view, must take, and when it does I hope the administration will reallocate monies from efforts we know have not worked to efforts that we believe work well.

The Senate and the Congress must also take a critical step: passage of the crime bill I have introduced in the Senate, a bill that will put into action the programs I have mentioned—community policing, prisons with drug treatment for violent offenders, drug court programs for probationers, antidrug trafficking enforcement, and prevention programs for juveniles.

Four years into our national drug strategy, Director, 4 years of losing the war, proves that we must focus on hard-core addicts, which you are proposing and are about to begin to do, focusing with the kind of tough enforcement, tough punishment, and tough treatment that I have outlined. So I welcome you, Director Brown, and former Director Bennett.

I might say that although I don't think Bill Bennett contemplated ever voting for me when I was trying to run for President—I don't know that he is running or not—I am not sure that I would vote for him, but I think he did a hell of a job when he started this process off because of the force of his intellect and personality, forcing the Nation to focus on this issue even in those areas where we have disagreed.

I view this as a maturation of the drug strategy. I think we have finally gotten to a point where we may be able to make some real progress. I am delighted you are in charge.

I now yield to my colleague from Utah.

STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome you, Director Brown, to the committee. We appreciate your appearing and we look forward to your presentation today. Like the chairman, I would also like to welcome Dr. William J. Bennett, the

first Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and thank him for being here as well.

Mr. Chairman, thus far this administration has been sending, in my opinion, a terrible signal to our country. Drug control is no longer a national priority. Mr. Chairman, I think it has to be, and I know you do, too. I know that the other members of this committee feel the same way.

Drugs and violence are problems that hit us all right at home. According to the Salt Lake Tribune, last year in my own home State of Utah, where we have been subjected to increasing drug and gang presences, there were 6,673 drug-related arrests. One-fifth of those arrested for drugs last year were juveniles. Our kids and our families are at risk and we cannot afford the kind of style-over-substance approach in the drug war that this White House has been offering.

When President Clinton was running for office he said, in recognition of the link between drugs and crime, that, "We have a national on our hands that requires a tough national response." This campaign rhetoric does not match the governing reality. Director Brown, the President's own drug czar, has recently conceded that drugs are no longer, "at the top of the agenda," of course, as an issue of the Washington Post on July 8 indicated.

The so-called interim strategy presented today is a major disappointment, consisting largely of generalities and pitches for various Clinton administration proposals, like the National Service Plan. It is a placebo, a political document so general as to be unhelpful and useful only to give the appearance of taking this issue as seriously as it should be taken.

Ironically, the so-called interim strategy notes on page 1 that there has been a, "loss of public focus which has also allowed the voices of those who would promote legalization to ring more loudly." The fault for this loss of public focus on the drug war is going to be laid at the feet of the Clinton administration.

The so-called interim strategy admits that it is not definitive. The document itself says that:

It does not contain detailed and quantifiable goals and objectives, nor does it address every facet of how the national Government can and will seek to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs.

For that, the American people will have to wait until next year. What a tragic abdication of leadership.

Now, the administration has hamstrung Director Brown from the beginning and is retreating in the drug war on far too many fronts. While giving Director Brown a paper promotion to Cabinet level, this administration has slashed the drug czar's office to the bone, from 146 positions to 25. I commiserate with you. I don't know how you can lead the fight in the war against drugs with just 25 people. We can't even run the basic administrative aspects of our Senate offices on that, and yet you are dealing with a national epidemic problem in this country, and I commiserate with you and I think it is ridiculous that they have done that to you.

I don't blame you for these problems. I think you are ready to go to work; you are going to work. You are trying to do what you can. Your limited staff is doing what they can do, and you are being hamstrung by an administration that doesn't give a damn.

The administration has sought to cut funding in the drug war. It has recommended eliminating the Drug Enforcement Agency, which has a proven track record of success. Now, I was pleased to see that the Attorney General herself does not want to have that happen. I don't either. They do a terrific job. They are experts in their field. The FBI does a terrific job; it is an expert in the fields that it oversees.

Budget allocations for prosecutors have been reduced by this administration. Prison construction is being cut, and it appears interdiction efforts are going to be cut back also. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Arizona that that would be a tragedy. The administration has been inadequate on both demand and supply side reduction.

This administration is turning the clock back on drug control, slipping inexorably into the old permissiveness of the Carter era. As A.M. Rosenthal observed in March in the New York Times, President Clinton's interest in fighting drugs can be summed up as, "No leadership, no role, no alerting, no policy."

When I once again prodded the administration to get tough on drugs recently, the White House suggested, perhaps facetiously—I hope so—that I had a, "narrow," focus on the law enforcement side of fighting drugs and said the administration is, "looking for a more balanced approach," to the drug war.

I wonder if these people who have made these comments have ever had to work with a drug addict. I have, and with one than one. I wonder if they have ever tried to bring somebody out of that world. I wonder if they have had to work with the police to try and stop kids from getting drugs. I have. I have to say that I have seen the devastation that it causes, and I am seeing what it is causing all over this country today as I see young people being sucked in because we don't have the guts to get out there and spend the money and do what has to be done to take this war to them and let them know what a terrible thing it is.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me if they are talking about looking for a more balanced approach to the drug war, the balance seems to be set at zero. In July, the Washington Post reported that the Clinton administration had agreed to a \$231-million cut in funding for drug treatment and education. Now, I hear all this talk about the supply side and about rehabilitation, and yet a \$231-million cut. Administration officials from the Office of Management and Budget were reported to have privately suggested many of the cuts. So much for the all-out war on the demand side of the equation.

The White House also responded to my recent prodding by suggesting I was playing, "turf politics," in questioning the elimination of the DEA, since the DEA is under this committee's jurisdiction. Someone might spread the word at the White House that the FBI is also under this committee's jurisdiction, and I am interested in both of them. Thus, a merged FBI-DEA amounts to no loss of so-called, "turf," even if that had been my concern with this merger, which, of course, it is not.

My criticisms go way beyond such petty concerns, and frankly I am shocked at that kind of cheapening of this issue. The drug war is nothing less than a battle for the lives and well-being of our chil-

dren and our families, and it is battle that we have to focus on now, not later.

A recent University of Michigan study demonstrates why. The study shows that the decline of drug use among our Nation's young people which began during the Reagan-Bush years has virtually halted and that marijuana and LSD use are on the rise. Dr. Mitchell Rosenthal, the president of Phoenix House, the Nation's largest residential treatment organization, stated that the study, "ought to be a big signal to the President and his Cabinet that they have got to pay serious attention to the drug problem."

The New York Times reported that Dr. Lloyd Johnson, who headed up the research team, concluded that the study indicates a more tolerant attitude toward drugs and the possibility of a steep increase in drug abuse. This study demonstrates the risk we face if the administration continues to drift aimlessly in this drug war.

Now, I hope that Director Brown's presentation today is the beginning of a growing commitment by the administration to sustaining a vigorous national effort against drugs. I am convinced that Director Brown wants to do that. I am convinced that he will if given the tools and the backup and the money to be able to do it.

As I have stated on numerous occasions, I stand ready to work with President Clinton and Director Brown and continuing the fight against drugs. I have provided his office with some thoughts on the problem. Through a sustained effort on the part of the Clinton administration, I believe we can continue to make progress in fighting drug abuse and drug-related violence throughout all of America, and I suggest we have to make progress. We have to take this thing on. We have to do the right things right now. We have to back you and give you the support and the tools and the people to be able to do it, and I am calling on this administration to get real about it and to quit acting like this is some sort of a negligible problem. It is not. It is a major problem. It is undermining America, it is hurting our youth. Even those who don't take the drugs are hurt by it. It is increasing the violence in this country. That is where we ought to be going to get after this violence. It is increasing gangs all over this country and it is making mincemeat out of some of our teenagers and others just because we don't do what we really should do.

Well, I am really happy to have you here, Director Brown, and I want to work with you and help you in every way I possibly can, but something has got to be done. We can't just keep putting this off. We have got to get it done. Thank you for coming. I look forward to hearing what your comments are today.

The CHAIRMAN. Director Brown, the floor is yours for any opening statement you have.

STATEMENT OF LEE PATRICK BROWN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BROWN. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the administration's 1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy, entitled "Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse." This document which I present to you on behalf of the President

provides a new direction, a new focus, in our Nation's struggle against drug trafficking, addiction, and drug abuse.

I am also pleased that Bill Bennett will be testifying today. As you know, he set up the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and in doing so he called on me several times for consultation. I have called on him, and will continue to do so during my tenure in office. What we want to do is build upon the foundation that he left for us.

To that end, this document is about change. It represents a new way of looking at America's substance abuse problem. As you pointed out in the report you issued in April, Mr. Chairman, we need to heed the lessons of the past 4 years and focus our resources and efforts on those strategies that work.

The strategy will be part of a concerted effort by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and indeed the entire administration, to aggressively respond to the rising tide of violence throughout the Nation. Mr. Chairman, 2 weeks ago I attended the funeral of 4-year-old Launice Smith, who was killed in a crossfire while watching a ball game at a public park in the District of Columbia. This precious child could have been my grandchild or the child or grandchild of anyone in this room. Her killing was reprehensible and it was a warning, for a society that sends its children to the grave instead of kindergarten is in peril indeed. This senseless violence has to stop.

Drive-by shootings, heinous acts of child abuse, and senseless murders have combined to create an environment in America that appears to be spiraling out of control in many areas of our country. This senseless violence has to stop. Serious drug abuse, especially hard-core use, is fueling this crisis of violence. The cycle of violence and drugs is not by any means limited to our urban areas. As Senator Hatch has correctly pointed out, rural America has a serious crime and drug problem which poses unique problems for law enforcement prevention efforts.

Drug use fosters a culture that accepts violence and serious risk to one's self and others as a natural way of life. This senseless violence has to stop, and that is what this interim strategy is all about. Let me outline for you the major directions in the National Drug Control Strategy.

First, the strategy shifts the focus to the most challenging and most difficult part of the drug problem, reducing drug use and its consequences by hard-core users. We will expand our Nation's treatment capacity so that those who need treatment can receive it. To this end, I am pleased that the conference committee on the Labor and Health Human Services appropriations bill reversed earlier reductions posed by the House. I turned my attention to this very critical issue immediately after I was sworn in and pursued this issue aggressively with Chairmen Harkin and Natcher.

We will focus on the population in the criminal justice system. Hard-core drug users are very likely to become involved in the criminal justice system, and we must take this opportunity to demand that they receive treatment. The President has asked me to work with Attorney General Reno and Health and Human Services Secretary Shalala to convene an interagency working group that will assess the current situation and recommend steps that the

Federal Government can take to promote such treatment at the Federal, State and local levels. I am pleased to report that the first meeting of the working group, comprised of my office, Health and Human Services, and Justice, took place on October 4, 1993.

Mr. Chairman, the provisions of your bill to create regional prisons to provide drug treatment, establishing a schedule of treatment of Federal drug-abusing prisoners and mandating drug testing of Federal offenders on post-conviction release, will add to our national efforts to break the link between drug use and crime.

The strategy calls for innovative programs like Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime to reduce drug use and alleviate prison overcrowding. The proposal in the crime bill to authorize drug courts and alternative punishments for young, nonviolent drug offenders directly complement this approach.

The President's health care reform plan will provide direct substance abuse treatment benefits for inpatient and residential treatment, intensive nonresidential treatment and relapse prevention, and unlimited substance abuse counseling and medical management. The strategy recognizes that drug dependence is a chronic, relapsing disorder, and that users stand little chance of recovery without the benefit of treatment.

Second, Mr. Chairman, we will empower communities to respond to the drug problem and encourage the development of effective community-based drug prevention programs. Drug policy will be a cornerstone of domestic policy in general and social policy, in particular, and will focus on those programs that have proven to be successful and cost-effective.

To do this, the President's economic plan targets antidrug monies, along with growth incentives and other social service investments, into the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities program. Through this historic effort, we will be able to target those areas in the country hit hardest by drug use and violence and begin the process of revitalizing our cities, as well as our rural areas.

Beyond the empowerment zones, our office is working with the Office of Management and Budget and the executive departments and agencies charged with the delivery of domestic discretionary programs to ensure that Federal funds are targeted to areas of greatest need. Our goal is that policy should dictate funding and not the other way around.

Third, the administration will work to reduce drug-related violence by expanding community policing, putting more police officers on the streets and taking guns out of the hands of criminals. We will promote certainty of punishment by ensuring that all drug offenders receive some type of sanction when they first encounter the criminal justice system.

This committee knows my personal commitment to community policing. I have seen it work in Houston and in New York, and it is working in numerous other towns and cities throughout America. Communities policies helps communities to reclaim their parks, playgrounds and streets, and to make them safe once again for our citizens, especially our children. It reduces the demand for drugs by discouraging all forms of criminal behavior and it complements the administration's efforts to empower communities because it

promotes the community cohesion which is so essential to drug abuse prevention.

Mr. Chairman, your proposal to authorize a 5-year, \$3.4 billion community policing cop on the beat program to put 50,000 more police officers on the streets is a key component to the President's pledge to put up to 100,000 police officers on the streets of our cities.

Passage of the Brady bill is an integral part of the thrust of the strategy to reduce violence. I feel if I have to wait for a week to get my clothes from the cleaners, I do not see why it is unreasonable to have a 5-day waiting period for handgun purchases. Further, the strategy calls for enactment of a ban on the domestic manufacture of all assault weapons.

Violence against students and teachers in our schools has now reached epidemic proportions. If our schools must first concern themselves with security, learning takes a back seat. The administration has submitted to Congress the Safe Schools Act to help schools combat violence. Your crime bill, Mr. Chairman, authorizes funds for enhanced school security measures and prevention programs to carry out what I believe is a moral imperative. We must protect our children.

The strategy proposes to have truth in sentencing. To ensure the certainty of punishment, we need to have appropriate punishments that are fair, objective and, most important, punishments that are carried out. The provisions of your bill, Mr. Chairman, for boot camps and the youth violence initiative will give States the flexibility to develop creative alternatives to traditional incarceration, and thus have more credible criminal justice systems.

Fourth, the strategy will target our prevention programs especially among inner-city youth, and reach out to pregnant women, women of child-bearing age, children, and others at risk for drug use.

Fifth, the strategy will maintain our international commitment to narcotics control and will work with other nations that demonstrate the political will to end illegal drug trafficking in their countries. To improve our international narcotics control policy, there will be a controlled shift of emphasis from the transit zones to the source countries. We will focus on the enhancement and building of law enforcement and judicial institutions and other programs to attack the drug trafficking infrastructure.

The strategy recognizes the urgent need to strengthen and broaden international cooperation against the global drug trade. The Presidential review process for international policies is currently examining the level of resources and coordination requirements for interdiction operations, along with other host country counter-narcotics assistance policies and priorities. The review process is nearly complete. It will result in recommendations that should significantly improve our interdiction operations. We need to closely scrutinize the increases in our interdiction accounts in recent years with a view toward funding those programs which have a proven record of success.

Sixth, the strategy advocates moving our drug control programs beyond ideological debates and building on proven strategies. To this end, the strategy redirects the use of war analogies to discuss

our Nation's drug abuse policy. We cannot succeed in this effort by declaring war on our own citizens. We need to avoid finger-pointing about who is tough on drugs or who is soft on drugs. Public policy can only be successful by objectively identifying problems and designing antidrug strategies based on the knowledge of what works. Moreover, we view drug control as more expansive than the familiar budget lines we are accustomed to and envision an effective strategy that includes economic growth, jobs, access to quality health care, and educational opportunities.

Mr. Chairman, my statement also addresses the issue of the reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. As you know, the statutory authorization of the office expires next month, and the administration strongly supports its reauthorization.

A recent GAO report on the reauthorization of the office noted the continuing need for a central planning agency to provide leadership and coordination of the Nation's drug control efforts. My full statement which I will leave with you contains a number of specific issues relating to reauthorization that I would be happy to address.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by making a couple of points. Here, we see the drug problem in America, the hard-core drug use that is consuming the vast majority of the drugs in this country that is pushing the problems of crime and violence in America. This is where we are focusing our strategy, on the problem that brings about misery and brings about despair and all too often brings about death.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask my staff to put that on one of those easels because that is worthwhile. And just for the record, that represents the total tons of cocaine consumed, and the hard-core users consume about 200—is that metric tons?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Two hundred tons, and casual users consume about 90,000 tons. The casual use is down in terms of total consumption of actual drug tonnage of cocaine, and it is up, obviously, considerably for hard-core users.

Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, just a clarification. That is in the United States?

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the United States, correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator DECONCINI. And will you produce any charts or information about how much cocaine is produced in order to get that much—or is estimated to be produced worldwide or in any country in order to get that much into the United States? Do you have that figure?

Mr. BROWN. We can provide it for you, sir.

Senator DECONCINI. OK, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, this chart here looks at the DAWN information. It tells a very vivid story about what we see happening to people who are going to emergency rooms of our hospitals for both cocaine as well as heroin. This tells us that we have to be concerned about our old nemesis of decades gone by, heroin. The cocaine problem is still a very, very serious problem in America.

Senator HATCH. That is in thousands, right, so you are talking 1992, 120,000 in cocaine?

Mr. BROWN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. DAWN, by the way, stands for Drug Abuse Warning Network.

Leave the other chart on there. Just put the charts in front of one other, OK? Put that chart on first and leave the others because I am going to be back referring to those charts.

Mr. BROWN. Finally, Mr. Chairman, this is what we are all about. Our children are at risk. This chart represents the number of our young people that are being arrested and, as you notice, it goes straight up.

The CHAIRMAN. That is arrests in hundreds of thousands?

Mr. BROWN. Arrests in hundreds of thousands.

The CHAIRMAN. So it has gone, in 1985, from about 125,000 to 450,000 juveniles by 1990 arrested for drugs. Is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Violent crime—I am sorry—violent crime, that is.

Senator HATCH. You are talking about 400 per 1,000, right?

Mr. BROWN. Per 100,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

Senator HATCH. Per 100,000?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH. Which is pretty high, so you are talking about 4,000 per million. If we times that by 250, we get an idea, so you are talking about a million kids.

Mr. BROWN. The core of what we are trying to do is reverse this trend. This represents our future. These are generations of people at risk. What we have to do is to reverse this trend and make sure this spiral goes down.

That concludes my summary statement and I will be happy, Mr. Chairman, to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LEE P. BROWN ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Good morning Chairman Biden and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. It is my pleasure to appear before you to discuss the Administration's 1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy, "Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse." This document, which I present to you on behalf of the President, gives new direction and focus to our nation's struggle against drug trafficking and drug abuse.

This document is about change. It represents a new way of looking at America's substance abuse problem. As you pointed out in the report you issued in April, Mr. Chairman, we need to heed the lessons of the past four years and focus our resources and efforts on those strategies that work.

The strategy will be part of a concerted effort by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the entire Administration to aggressively respond to the rising tide of violence throughout the nation.

Two weeks ago, I attended the funeral of four year old Launice Smith who was killed in a cross-fire while watching a ball game at a public park in the District of Columbia. This precious child could have been my grandchild or the child or grandchild of any one in this room. This type of occurrence is morally reprehensible.

This senseless violence has to stop.

Drive-by shootings, heinous acts of child abuse, and senseless murders have combined to create an environment that appears to be spiraling out of control in many areas of the country.

This senseless violence has to stop.

Serious drug abuse, especially hard-core drug use, is fueling this crisis of violence. Data released recently by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) showed a 10 percent nationwide increase in drug-related hospital emergency room episodes between 1991 and 1992. Cocaine-related emergencies increased by 18 percent, and heroin-related episodes rose by 34 percent. The cycle of violence and drugs is not by any ways limited to our urban areas. As Senator

Hatch has correctly pointed out, rural America has a serious crime and drug problem which poses unique problems for law enforcement and prevention efforts. The infiltration of drug gangs into rural areas is further evidence of the extent of drugs and violence.

Drug use fosters a culture that accepts violence and serious risk to oneself and others as a natural way of life. It creates communities where employment is scarce, school drop-out rates high, decent health care inaccessible, HIV/AIDS rampant, violence and property crime rates are high, and social services ineffective.

This senseless violence has to stop.

How does the Administration's drug strategy respond to this crisis? Let me outline for you the major new directions in the National Drug Control Strategy.

First, the strategy shifts the focus to the most challenging and difficult part of the drug problem—reducing drug use and its consequences by hard core users, especially those in our inner cities, among the disadvantaged, and among the criminal justice population. In the past, the Federal emphasis was directed toward reducing casual or intermittent drug use.

Hard-core drug use fuels the overall demand for drugs and is the primary cause for so much of the disruption we see in our social landscape today. We must be prepared to focus as never before on solutions to the problems of heavy drug use from both the criminal justice and public health perspectives. This is how we will do it.

We will expand our Nation's treatment capacity so that those who need treatment can receive it. To this end, I am pleased that the Conference Committee on the Labor-HHS Appropriations Bill reversed earlier reductions proposed by the House. I turned my attention to this very critical issue immediately after I was sworn in and pursued this issue aggressively with Chairmen Harkin and Natcher. I appreciate their support and that of the members of this committee who have championed this effort.

In response to the criticism of this Committee that the existing data sources—the National Household Survey, the High School Senior Survey, and the Drug Abuse Warning Network—do not effectively measure hard core drug use, ONDCP has undertaken two projects. One is a Heavy Users Pilot Project, which will be conducted with HHS, that will test the feasibility of measuring the size, characteristics, and location of the hard-core user population. The other is an effort known as the "Pulse Check" to provide current drug market trends at the local level based on direct contact with police, street ethnographers, and treatment providers.

These studies will yield invaluable data on the nature and extent of the hard-core drug using population in order to develop drug treatment and prevention programs that effectively reach this population.

We will focus on the population in the criminal justice system. Hard core drug users are more than likely to become involved in the criminal justice system and we must take this opportunity to demand that they receive treatment. Effective programs throughout the criminal justice system can reduce further drug use and criminal recidivism. The incentive to seriously undergo treatment and complete it is augmented when the alternative is incarceration.

The President has asked me to work with Attorney General Reno and HHS Secretary Shalala to convene an interagency working group that will assess the current situation and recommend steps that the Federal government can take to promote such treatment at the Federal, state, and local levels. I am pleased to report that the first meeting of the working group comprised of ONDCP, HHS, and Justice took place on October 4, 1993.

Mr. Chairman, the provisions in your bill to create regional prisons to provide drug treatment, establishing a schedule of treatment of Federal drug-abusing prisoners, and mandating drug testing of Federal offenders on post-conviction release will add to our national efforts to break the link between drug use and crime.

The Strategy calls for innovative programs like Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) to reduce drug use and alleviate prison overcrowding. The proposal in the crime bill to authorize drug courts and alternative punishments for young non-violent drug offenders directly complements this approach.

The President's Health Care Reform plan will provide direct substance abuse treatment benefits for inpatient and residential treatment, intensive non-residential treatment, and relapse prevention, and unlimited substance abuse counseling and medical management.

Health care reform will establish better linkages between the treatment system and primary health care providers and improve access to services for underserved and hard to reach populations. ONDCP is mindful of the need to preserve the integrity of the existing drug treatment delivery system as we move toward the health care structure proposed by the Administration. Our goal is the continuity—and enhancement—of appropriate and cost effective services. This is a critical transition period, and I have discussed with Senator Kennedy the need to preserve such services.

The strategy recognizes that drug dependence is a chronic, relapsing disorder, and that users stand little chance of recovery without the benefit of treatment. We have a new view of user accountability. In addition to effective criminal justice, we need to fill our treatment programs and make individuals and their communities accountable for addressing their drug problem by empowering them to effectively deal with problems at the local level.

Second, we will empower communities to respond to the drug problem and encourage the development of effective community-based drug prevention programs. Drug policy will be a cornerstone of domestic policy in general and social policy in particular, and will focus on those programs that have been successful and cost-effective. It is time to get down to business of identifying, targeting, and funding those programs that show results—and dropping those that do not.

Some of the best solutions to the drug problem have resulted from successful community coalitions. Successful drug prevention and treatment requires a multifaceted approach that brings to bear the resources of Federal, state, and local governments as well as the private sector in a concerted effort to attack the systemic root causes of serious drug abuse—poverty, hopelessness, and a lack of opportunity. Efforts of groups like the “Partnership for a Drug-Free America” and “Drugs Don’t Work” are extremely helpful in this effort.

To do this, the President’s economic plan targets anti-drug monies—along with growth incentives and other social service investments—into the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities program. Through this historic effort, we will be able to target those areas of the country hit hardest by drug use and violence and begin the process of revitalizing our cities and rural areas. ONDCP is actively involved in the Empowerment Zone planning process, under the leadership of the Vice President Gore, to insure that this program effectively targets hard-core drug use and violence.

Beyond the Empowerment Zone program, ONDCP is working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Executive Departments and agencies charged with the delivery of domestic discretionary programs, to insure that Federal funds are targeted to areas of greatest need. Our goal is that policy should dictate funding, and not the other way around.

Third, The Administration will work to reduce drug-related violence by expanding community policing, putting more police on the streets, and taking guns out of the hands of criminals. We will promote the certainty of punishment by ensuring that all drug offenders receive some type of sanction when they first encounter the criminal justice system.

This Committee knows my personal commitment to community policing. I have seen it work in Houston and New York, and it is working in numerous other towns and cities throughout America. Community policing helps communities to reclaim their parks, playgrounds, and streets and to make them safe once again for our citizens. It reduces the demand for drugs by discouraging all forms of criminal behavior. And it compliments the Administration’s effort to empower communities because it promotes community cohesion, which is so essential to drug abuse prevention.

Mr. Chairman, your proposal to authorize a five-year, \$3.4 billion community policing “Cop On the Beat” program to put 50,000 police officers on the street—is a key component of the President’s 100,000 police initiative. In addition, the proposal to provide funds for students who commit to four years of police service will further bolster the ability of communities to stem the tide of violence.

Passage of the Brady Bill is integral to the thrust of the strategy to reduce violence. If I have to wait a week to get my clothes from the cleaners, I do not see why it is unreasonable to have a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases. Further, the strategy calls for the enactment of a ban on the domestic manufacture of all assault weapons. We need to bring the same outrage to bear against the arms race and gun running that occurs

in neighborhood throughout the nation that kills and maims civilians, as we do to the gun violence around the world that kills and injures our soldiers on missions of peace.

Violence against students and teachers in our schools has now reached epidemic proportions. If our schools must first concern themselves with security, learning takes a back seat. Recently a second-grade teacher in a District public school asked her class what type of extra-curricula activities would they like to have this school year. I am told they responded, "Have someone tell us how we can be safe." This situation is unacceptable in any school in the nation.

The Administration has submitted to Congress the Safe Schools Act to help schools combat violence. Your crime bill, Mr. Chairman, authorizes funds for enhanced school security measures and prevention programs to carry out this moral imperative.

The Strategy proposes to have "truth in sentencing." To ensure the certainty of punishment, we need to have appropriate punishments that are fair, objective, and carried out. Serious violators require incarceration, and there must be sufficient space to house them. Others, particularly, first-time non-violent offenders, would be better served by alternative community-based corrections combined with treatment and after-care.

The provisions in your bill, Mr. Chairman, for boot camps, and the youth violence initiative you have proposed will give states the flexibility to develop creative alternatives to traditional incarceration and thus have more credible criminal justice systems.

The Strategy will bring about a more coordinated and integrated Federal law enforcement effort. Though we are increasing our focus on community programs and efforts, Federal law enforcement is an important part of our overall drug control efforts. Our Federal law enforcement agencies will attack criminal enterprises engaged in the production, trafficking, and distribution of cocaine and heroin. We must, however, have an integrated strategy that effectively distributes responsibilities among Federal, state, and local governments. Our goal must be to facilitate a true partnership among all levels of government.

Fourth, the Strategy will target our prevention program, especially among inner-city youth, and reach out to pregnant women, women of child bearing age, children, and others at-risk for drug use. We will continue efforts to deter first-time and casual drug use. In this regard, the Strategy views alcohol abuse, especially underage drinking, as part of the drug problem.

Citizens of all ages, and from all walks of life, can become meaningfully involved in the lives of at-risk populations and help them to avoid drug use and crime. The President's National Service Plan will play an important role in helping Americans get involved with projects that will provide direct services to our Nation's neighborhoods.

Fifth, the Strategy will maintain our international commitment to narcotics control and will work with other nations that demonstrate the political will to end illegal drug trafficking. If drugs flow unchecked to the United States, our national security and ability to reduce drug consumption will be undermined. We will continue to apply international law enforcement pressure on those criminal who traffic in drugs. The strategy will approach this aspect of drug policy differently than in the past.

To improve our international narcotics control policy, there will be a controlled shift of emphasis from the transit zones to the source countries. We will focus on the enhancement and building of law enforcement and judicial institutions, interdiction efforts, and other programs to attack the drug-trafficking infrastructure. We will selectively back alternative development and crop control programs when there is a strong prospect or record of success. We will also support demand reduction and public awareness activities, which are essential to developing public anti-drug sentiment and political pressure against the illegal drug trade in consumer and transit nations.

The Strategy recognizes the urgent need to strengthen and broaden international cooperation against the global drug trade. The cultivation, production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs is an increasingly global problem that undermines political and economic stability. For example, criminal syndicates are taking advantage of the political turmoil in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world to expand narcotics trafficking. The dramatic increase in heroin production and trafficking from Burma through Thailand and China requires broad multi-national attention. The United States can-

not confront this problem alone. The Strategy proposes the increased use of established international and regional organizations that have been useful in coordinating multi-national activities to address such problems as maritime smuggling, money laundering, and the flow of diversion of essential and precursor chemicals.

The Presidential review process for international policies is currently examining the level of resources and coordination requirements for interdiction operations, along with other host-country counter-narcotics assistance policies and priorities. Over time we have developed a better understanding of where we can effectively apply our interdiction resources and where they make a relatively small contribution. The review process is nearly complete. It will result in recommendations that should significantly improve our interdiction operations. As you noted in your April report, Senator Biden, we need to closely scrutinize the increases in the interdiction accounts in recent years with the view toward funding those programs which have proven records of success.

Sixth, The Strategy advocates moving our drug control programs beyond ideological debates, and building on proven strategies. To this end, the strategy rejects the use of "war" analogies to discuss our nation's drug abuse policy. You cannot succeed in this effort by declaring on our own citizens. We need to avoid finger pointing about who is "tough" or "soft" on drugs. Public policy can only be successful by objectively identifying problems, and designing anti-drug strategies based on the knowledge of what works. Moreover, we view drug control as more expansive than familiar budget line items, and envisions an effective strategy that includes economic growth, jobs, access to quality health care, and educational opportunities.

ONDCP REAUTHORIZATION

Let me now address the issue of ONDCP's operation and authority. As you know, the statutory authorization for ONDCP expires next month and the Administration strongly supports its reauthorization. A recent GAO Report on the reauthorization of the office noted the continuing need for a central planning agency to provide leadership and coordination for the Nation's drug control efforts.

Measures of Success—One of the key challenges facing ONDCP in the future is to improve measures for assessing the progress being made under the National Drug Control Strategies. While the reduction in drug use is one measure, we also need to look at what fuels drug use among hard core drug users. Thus, to measure success in our drug policy, we must also measure reductions in other social harms, such as drug use among arrestees, the extent of drug-related crime, the number of infants exposed to drugs in utero, drop-out rates, unemployment, and other similar factors.

Through the use of States' needs assessments plans, we will also look for concrete results from specific programs and establish performance standards for drug treatment providers. This will enable local communities to assess the effectiveness of their treatment providers and will facilitate more informed funding decisions.

Executive Branch Coordination—This Committee has long expressed concern that ONDCP and the Federal drug control agencies need to work more cooperatively to develop, assess, and coordinate the national drug control policy.

The Administration has already taken a number of steps to address this problem. The President has made the Director of ONDCP a member of the Cabinet and the Domestic Policy Council. These are the major policy coordinating groups of the Federal government. I believe it is important to note that neither of my predecessors were members of the Cabinet or the DPC. To date, meetings of both the Cabinet and the DPC have had discussions of drug control issues on their agenda.

I believe that this approach will address the disagreements and conflicts that have strained working relationships between ONDCP and other executive departments in the past. A new attitude exists in the Executive Branch. ONDCP is viewed as a serious player in national policy formulation by the Administration.

This new structure will enable ONDCP to address problems of wasteful duplication, turf battles, and inter-agency infighting.

Budget Certification—ONDCP's budget certification process is of important concern to the committee. Budget certification is an important responsibility of the Office and is necessary to assure implementation of the National Strategy. Further, ONDCP needs to have input during drug control agency budget formulation early in the budget process. ONDCP will work with the Executive branch to ensure that agency budget requests conform to the priorities of the National Strategy.

Politicization of the ONDCP—Senator Simon and other members of this Committee have expressed concern about the politicization of ONDCP's activities in the

past. Since being confirmed as Director, I have refrained from engaging in any partisan political activities.

There is one point I would like to strongly emphasize before concluding. The Administration is, without any reservation, opposed to the legalization, decriminalization, or medicalization of illegal drugs. I can't think of anything that would pose a tougher challenge to communities presently hit hardest by drug abuse than legalization. The declines that have been registered thus far in the use of illegal drugs are in large part the direct result of the legal prohibition against use. Legalization would be a catastrophe for the residents of our disadvantaged communities. Even the misguided proponents of legalization admit drug use would increase, especially among our most impoverished citizens. Those who have the least, would stand to lose the most.

The President is committed to confronting drugs—what he has aptly referred to as a “many-headed monster”—through an aggressive and comprehensive National Strategy. But the effectiveness of our strategy must be seen at the community level, and it is in the neighborhoods towns, and households throughout this nation that the effort must be undertaken.

It is the family that nurtures the values that inform and guide human behavior, and that are essential to our survival as a people: honesty, generosity, humility, civic responsibility, and a sense of community. Yet these values must be taught: they are not innate. However, government can create an atmosphere where this nurturing process can take place. It can create an environment where we recognize problems, and draw upon our collective will—without regard to partisan or ideological differences—to solve them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will move to a 10-minute rule because there is a good deal of interest in this strategy.

Let me begin by saying I will withhold my questions that I will have relative to the reauthorization of the office which I fought to have established, but I must tell you and tell the administration that the reauthorization will have a rougher road—and I say this as the author of the legislation. I am the guy that literally wrote, by myself, this legislation and I strongly support it, but I would warn the administration that unless the administration gives the grant of authority through executive orders that they have agreed to, and they have done it so far, to you to make that office more workable and give you the resources, I predict to you you will have rough sledding up here in terms of the reauthorization.

So as was said years ago in this place, let the word go forth. They had better give you some teeth and some money or we are going to have trouble in terms of the reauthorization, and I say that as the author of the legislation, and strongly support the reauthorization.

Now, let me, in the 10 minutes that I have, follow up on a few points that you have made, and I will come back on a second round to some additional more specific points. You talked about community policing and its relationship to the drug problem. I would point out, in the alternative drug strategy, which is turning out not to be an alternative this time, each year that I have produced to coincide with the President's strategy, there is a chart we have in there that I would like to submit for the record which I hope puts to rest the misunderstanding most people in America have.

I think most people in America think that we have, in fact, significantly increased our policing efforts over the last two decades and that policing doesn't seem to work. Therefore, why are we adding more cops in the crime bill and as part of the drug strategy?

I put a chart in here listing the 10 largest cities in America—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, San Diego, Detroit, Dallas, Phoenix, and San Antonio—and list them in

terms of the number of police officers they had that were working in total for those cities in the year 1989 and the number that are working for those cities in the year 1992.

Without going into detail, let me give you the gross numbers. There were 68,418 policemen in the year 1989 in the 10 largest cities in America, and this pattern holds up, by the way, all the way through cities to the next 10, to the top 100, and so on. There were 68,418 police officers in those 10 cities. In the year 1992, there were 70,260, barely a 2,000 increase, the point being that the entire increase in that period is a 2.69-percent increase, and that is not for community policing, except notably in the two outfits that you ran, New York and Houston, the number was up, on average, 5.5 percent and mostly in community policing.

I get these letters and the press says, well, gee, you know, policing doesn't work, Biden. Why are you putting more police in the crime bill? It is theoretically arguable to say policing doesn't work, but you can't offer as proof that it doesn't work that we have tried it and it hasn't worked. It is a little like Chesterton comment about christianity: it is not that christianity has been tried and found wanting, but it has not been tried at all, or something to that effect.

So one of the points that the Director makes is the need and the relationship for additional police to deal with making this strategy function, and the addition is not on top of some large increase that has occurred over the last decade. In fact, that has not occurred. If you take it back 20 years, it is even more stark how little the increase is nationwide in terms of the number of police.

But I would ask my staff to put up a few charts as well. One is the nationwide—leave those up, please, and put up another easel because I am going to be going back to those.


The first one is a chart showing national casual drug use between the years 1985 and 1992. Through the efforts of the drug strategy and one Republican administration and a number of events that were already in play before the first strategy even came along, casual drug use has dropped, as you see, from 23 million down to, 1992, slightly over 11 million casual drug users. Now, that is progress. That is important and that is real. What I am about to suggest is not that we should not any longer pay attention to that. We still should pay attention to that, but that should not be the priority.

I want to put up the second chart here, and there are many I will submit for the record.

[The charts referred to follow:]


Violent Crime.1

Record Levels of Violent Crime




Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report

The Rise of Murder




Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report

Nationwide Cocaine Overdoses




Source: US Department of Health & Human Services, Drug Abuse Warning Network


Nationwide Drug Overdoses



Drug Overdoses: More Than When the Strategy Began




Heroin Overdoses -- More Than When the Strategy Began




Source: US Department of Health & Human Services, Drug Abuse Warning Network

Cocaine Overdoses: More Than When the Strategy Began




Source: US Department of Health & Human Services, Drug Abuse Warning Network


Nationwide "Casual" Drug Use




Source: Department of Health & Human Services, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse

Drug Courts: Tough Treatment for Non-Violent Drug Probationers

Boot Camps: Smart Punishment for Non-Violent Offenders




Criminals Behind Bars (1993) -- 1.37 Million Total


State & Local Total = 1,290,000 Inmates
Annual Cost = \$23.5 Billion (FY 1990*)

Federal Total = 80,000 Inmates
Annual Cost = \$2.13 Billion (FY 1993)

* Most Recent Data Available


Lost Opportunity: Rising Cocaine Purity for Drug Traffickers



Cocaine on the Streets: The Recent Rise in Purity


Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy, US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration

Escalating Heroin Purity



Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy, US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration

Drug Interdiction Expenditures



The CHAIRMAN. This is violent crime in America, and I would argue there is a relationship between the second and third chart I am about to put up and I am going to ask you to comment on this, Director.

In 1985, the total number of violent crimes in America was slightly over 1,300,000. In 1992, it is over 1,900,000 violent crimes. There is overwhelming and unrelenting data to suggest that—put up the chart, please, that the Director had showing casual use and—that first chart he had.

I would argue, that the relationship between the growth of heavy drug users and violent crime is almost directly proportional. I am not making that literal argument, but is it the administration's view that absent impacting upon and reducing the heavy drug use, the number of what in the vernacular they would call addicts—absent reducing that dark blue blob up there, you are not likely to reduce these towering figures of violent crimes recorded in America. Do you agree with that assertion?

Mr. BROWN. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have spent all of my adult career in law enforcement. I have worked undercover narcotics. I have walked the streets of our cities and I have served at the head of several major police departments in America. I can tell you from firsthand experience there is a direct relationship between hard-core drug use and the violent crime that is paralyzing our country right now. I see it as I go out into the communities today. There is a direct relationship.

That, along with the hard-core drug use and the proliferation of guns on our streets, is what is bringing about the misery and despair and, all too often, death in this country. Those are what I call the twin evils of American society.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I happen to agree with you, as you know, and this is the last time I will say it, but I will say it for the record. Most of my views in their formulation were helped by you in your other incarnations as a chief of police and a leading law enforcement officer in the Nation. So it is not that I am asking these questions expecting a significantly different answer, but I think it is important for the record that people understand why you believe and why I believe we should be focusing on hard-core users.

I would point out that is only cocaine use. That heavy user is of cocaine, the amount of cocaine that is consumed, and I would argue that the criticism of the Carter administration relative to cocaine, at least the veiled criticism in my colleague's statement, was accurate. We had a director of drug policy in the Carter administration who said why are we picking on cocaine. I think his name was Boren, if I am not mistaken. Well, that is the reason why we pick on cocaine.

Every expert we have had before us here tells us that there is a relationship between paranoia and drug-induced paranoia as a consequence of cocaine. The experts tell me, doctor, that there is a relationship between gratuitous violence and cocaine consumption, someone being on cocaine at the time that violence is committed. It used to be that someone would take your wallet at gun point; if you gave them your wallet, they would walk away. Now, they take your wallet at gun point, start to walk away and say,

what the hell, and walk back and blow your brains out. Well, there is a relationship there.

The third chart I would like to put up—and I am not going to get much beyond this now, but I will come back to this to give my colleagues an opportunity to speak, but I want to put this in focus and why I think the drug strategy and the crime bill go hand in hand.

If you take a look at this third chart, we are talking about the total number of State offenders on probation. Out there in America right now there are over 2,700,000 people who have committed a crime, been convicted of a crime, and been put on probation. Of those 2,700,000 people, 1.4 million of them are drug offenders on probation. Of the total number of those people who are the drug offenders on probation, only 800,000 of them have even been tested or treated for their drug problem, which leaves 600,000 convicted drug offenders not in a prison setting and under no supervision whatsoever roaming the streets.

The average number of crimes committed by a drug addict—and there is a definition of what constitutes an addict versus an offender, and not all these are drug addicts, but the average number of crimes committed by a drug addict in America is 200 a year.

Now, the last chart I will put up here is on treatment. From the last strategy in 1990, "Understanding Drug Treatment," what you show is the prevalence of predatory crime before and after treatment. By "predatory crime" we mean not the crime of having consumed the drug, but the crime that flows from having consumed the drug, whether it is the robbery or the burglary or the murder or the assault that occurs while that person is under the influence of drugs.

The percentage of patients treated involved in predatory crime—and I don't have the chart to show you here, but the point is after 3 months, the number of crimes they commit drops almost off the scale while they are in treatment. After a 3-month follow-up, it ticks up a little bit. After a 1-year follow-up, it ticks up a little more, and then after a 3- to 5-year follow-up, it drops again. But the highest it gets after treatment is one-half of the number of predatory crimes committed by the addict, by the drug abuser, without treatment.

We have 600,000 drug offenders on probation with not one single, solitary bit of supervision—no probation officer to whom they report, no treatment, no regime whatsoever. That is why I applaud you in your drug strategy of attempting to focus on not merely that chart, but that crop of folks who never get into the prison system. That is why the drug courts you are supporting are important.

What we do in the crime bill and what you are proposing here, and what we will do more of, I hope, in the drug bill that comes up next year, is to provide for diversion of those people into heavy probation and treatment regimes. But right now, we have got 600,000 folks convicted, roaming the street, with not one ounce of supervision, none whatsoever.

So until we get to treatment and until we get to supervising those who have been convicted and treating those who are in a prison setting, I respectfully suggest the correlation between heavy

drug use and violent crime in America is going to continue along the same lines that you have.

I thank you for your strategy. I have a number of specific questions after my colleagues finish their questioning, but I would like you to conclude by commenting on whether or not you think treatment impacts upon violence and the number of crimes committed.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I think most people who are involved in law enforcement, my colleagues throughout the country, clearly understand that what we have been doing in trying to address the violence problem brought about by hard-core drug use has not worked. Most understand that the addict is a big part of the drug problem, and thus a big part of the violence problem. Unless we can do something to break that cycle, we are not going to be able to address the problem.

We understand that arresting people who commit crimes is very important, but that alone won't solve the problem. In New York City when I served as the police commissioner, for example, that city could arrest up to 100,000 people a year just for narcotics violations. That is bigger than most cities in America. But the problem did not go away, and that is the reason why our strategy contains a strong emphasis on treatment. We have to break that cycle. We know that treatment works.

I take the opportunity as I travel throughout America to visit treatment programs in jails, in prisons, and our people who are under supervision, and it must be an important element of what we are about. That is the reason the President has directed that I coordinate an interagency working group with Health and Human Services and the Justice Department to make sure we have an effective treatment program within the criminal justice system at the Federal, State and local level.

The CHAIRMAN. The evidence, as I read it, and the testimony that has come before this committee is there is not a fundamental difference in the effect of treatment where it is purely voluntary and one where it is, in effect, coerced because it is in a prison system. It used to be the notion that you had to see God to decide you wanted to be cured, and therefore unless that was the case, treatment was ineffective. The studies show that is simply not true.

The second thing the studies show is that the measure that we call for in terms of measuring success for drug treatment is a measure and a level we don't ask for anything else. If we cure after 1 year only 40 percent of the people who are addicted to drugs, or even 20 percent, that is a success rate that would have a phenomenal impact upon violent crime in America.

People tell me, well, gee, if you don't cure 70, 80, 90 percent of these people, you are wasting money. If we set that standard to defense contractors or if we put that standard on public education in America or if we put that standard on any other thing we do on a massive basis in America, we would shut down the public schools, we would shut down the military, we would shut down about everything we do. I think it is time we get wise on this, and I think the people are and I know you have been, and now we have got to find the money to do this.

I yield to my colleague from Utah.

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that a statement by Senator Thurmond be placed in the record at an appropriate place.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STROM THURMOND

Mr. Chairman: Today, we will hear from Director Brown as the Administration releases its interim drug control strategy. While a synopsis of the strategy was recently made available to members of the Judiciary Committee, today is our first glimpse at their substantive recommendations.

The ravages of illicit drug use in America is intolerable and tears the very fabric of our society. The incidents of violent crime is most often related to drugs. The fight to take back the streets from violent offenders must be waged at the Federal, state and local levels.

Those who use drugs must know that accountability is a primary objective in any comprehensive drug control strategy. Additionally, education for drug prevention and treatment are important components in addressing this problem. Early education is a key to convincing young people that drug use leads to adverse consequences.

Reducing the demand for drugs is vital and equally compelling is the need for addressing the supply side of this equation. Clearly this is a war which must be fought simultaneously on all fronts. This includes a coordinated effort among Federal law enforcement agencies as well as cooperation with state and local governments.

The type of national response needed for drug prevention is reflected in S.1356, the Neighborhood Security Act of 1993, of which I am a cosponsor. Among other provisions, this proposal provides much needed assistance to state and local governments for hiring new police officers and establishing drug task forces. Also, this bill will enhance personnel at the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Drug Czar's office.

Mr. Chairman, the American people deserve our strongest response to eradicating illegal drug use in this country. This insidious threat undermines our ability to thrive as a Nation as it moves like a growing cancer across America, in our cities, towns and rural communities. There must be no retreat in our determination for a successful conclusion to this war. A drug free society is an achievable goal and one that we can accomplish through law enforcement, education, and appropriate drug treatment programs.

I look forward to the testimony today from Director Brown and also from William Bennett, who served with distinction in the office now held by Director Brown.

Senator HATCH. Now, we are in a tough budget situation. I alluded to it in my opening remarks, and budget cuts are needed for our economic health, but I think that doesn't mean that every item in the budget should be cut or cut as heavily as every other program. Earlier this year, the Democratic-controlled House, apparently at the administration's suggestion, cut \$231 million in drug treatment and education funds. Congress has cut, among other things, about \$47 million in foreign drug interdiction.

Now, is the drug war, in your view, one place where budget-cutting should be a secondary concern, especially since, over the long term, a successful drug strategy will actually cost the Government and our society a lot less?

Mr. BROWN. As I mentioned in my statement, Senator, we monitor very closely what occurs in the Congress in terms of the issue of our drug control budget. As you know, the President asked for a record \$13 billion this year. The Congress did cut from the Health and Human Services block grant.

I worked extremely hard at the conference level to get that taken care of, and we ultimately ended up with almost \$40-million-something more than the President asked for. I think that is a real step forward. It recognizes the importance of treatment. We were not as

successful in some of our education money. There was a reduction there, and there was a reduction in our Department of Defense money for counter-narcotics efforts in our international program.

In answer to your question, from my position I don't see any element that is more important than controlling narcotics right now. People in America are being killed. We have to be as concerned about the loss of our lives in America as we are about the concern of loss of lives of our military people abroad. It is that serious, and so I am a strong advocate of making sure that we get the dollars that are necessary to get the job done.

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. President Clinton pledged in his campaign to fund treatment on demand as a part of a, "balanced approach," to the drug war. Now, that would have required, according to some estimates, some \$2 billion more. I am citing the Washington Post article on July 2nd of this year. He and you have reaffirmed a commitment to demand reduction. Yet, treatment funding has been cut. How can you reconcile these promises with the actual funding cuts? Now, I know you can't control this, but I am——

Mr. BROWN. I terms of the block grant money from Health and Human Services, we have, at least at the conference committee, more than what was even asked for by the President. So we were able to get that restored. As you know, also, the President will be submitting to Congress very soon his health care reform proposal, and I was very pleased that we were able to get in that plan a substance abuse treatment component. That will go a long, long way to bridge the gap between those who need treatment and those who are able to get it right now, and so we are working on that.

We are now working with Health and Human Services in respect to the block grant to make that transition between when the health care system proposal will become a reality and now. So that is still a major goal and one that, if the health reform proposal is passed, will be a historic step as far as drug treatment is concerned.

Senator HATCH. Of course, my point is with the suggestion of the administration. They cut \$231 million. Now, you got some of that back, but there is still about \$173 million going to be cut over what was there, and that is by mid-range calculations right now. Now, my question was can you afford to lose that money in light of what you are saying here today and in light of some of the things that some of us have pointed out up here today. I know you have to stand up for the administration, but replacing \$40 million back in, or thereabouts, of the \$231 million that the administration is cutting doesn't cut it. It really isn't going to do the job. In the end, if we can't attack this violence and the drugs that in many respects are causing it and we don't have the money to do it, it is just going to get worse.

Mr. BROWN. As you know, the President did ask for over \$13 billion for his drug control program. The Congress did cut in a number of areas. You asked for my opinion. My opinion is that we needed every penny that the President asked for. If we are going to be effective in carrying out our program, we need the resources to do so.

Senator HATCH. Well, your strategy estimates that 1.1 million persons do not receive treatment because of inadequate treatment

capacity. How did you arrive at that estimate? That is in your strategy, page 7.

Mr. BROWN. There is a formula we used and I will be delighted to provide that to you, how we arrived at that number.

Senator HATCH. That would be fine. You suggest that we must increase treatment capacity. Yet, your strategy does not discuss at all such funding increases necessary to increase treatment capacity. I realize that this is an interim strategy and it is not as definitive as the one that you intend to deliver next February, but surely you must be well on your way to constructing the centerpiece of the administration's, to use their term, "balanced," strategy.

Now, can you give us an indication of whether treatment funding will go up or down next year, and approximately how much?

Mr. BROWN. As you may recall, this committee asked that I come back with an interim strategy, an interim strategy that would outline the broad principles of the Clinton administration as far as drug control is concerned. It was understood that we would not have the details in the interim strategy which I presented to you today.

Senator HATCH. Right.

Mr. BROWN. It was understood we would not have the budget information, not unlike the first strategy that Bill Bennett put forth. It was a strategy that outlined the broad principles. What we are doing now is meeting with the various drug control agencies in the Federal Government. This strategy now provides the framework—if you would, the road map—for developing budgets. The budgets are, as you know, not developed at this time for fiscal year 1995. We are working on that so that we will be able to submit a more detailed strategy to the Congress come February 1, 1994.

Senator HATCH. All right, but regarding treatment priorities and implementation, you say on page 8 of your strategy that you, together with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, will, "assess the current situation and recommend steps to promote such treatment." Do you have anything more concrete that you could share with us with regard to these particular priorities?

I am all for treatment, but should we not have some way of discerning which treatment programs work and which ones we should be putting our monies behind, which we should fund and which we shouldn't fund? We ought to be funding those that work. Funding for treatment for the general public seems to be cut. Yet, the President has signed onto a crime bill which offers treatment on demand for Federal prisoners. Now, should addicts in jail be preferred to those outside?

Mr. BROWN. The statement that you refer to comes from the place in the document that deals with treatment within the criminal justice system. The President has asked that I convene an interagency working group involving the Justice Department and Health and Human Services to look at what needs to be done to have treatment within the criminal justice system at the Federal, State and local levels.

As we see it, it is not one or the other. In this country, tens of thousands of people are arrested each year. Many of them have drug problems. It just makes good sense to provide treatment, even

though it is coerced treatment. It is kind of like the carrot and the stick; you have an alternative. You can stay in jail, go to jail, or you get treatment. I think in the long run, having a comprehensive treatment program that involves those who are arrested and have a drug problem, as well as those who are not arrested, is the best policy for this country.

Senator HATCH. All right. I might say, in fact, the first Bennett strategy did have budget recommendations. Let me just say this. In the health care reform proposal, initially only 30 days—this is the Clinton health care reform proposal—initially, only 30 days of residential treatment for drug abusers is covered, which some experts say is wholly inadequate, and I can tell you personally, and I know you know personally, isn't going to cut it, isn't going to do the job, especially for hard-core addicts. In 1998, the coverage goes up to 90 days, which I think almost anybody would admit is probably not enough either.

Based on your research, how long is necessary to treat drug dependency? Is 30 days adequate, is 90 days adequate, or just what does it take? How much does sufficient treatment for hard-core drug dependency cost? These are things we have got to have answers to.

Mr. BROWN. In the year 2001, it goes up to unlimited treatment. There is no one answer for the whole problem. There is no silver bullet to address the drug addiction problem. Different people will need—

Senator HATCH. Yes, but you see what I am saying. It is one thing to say we are going to give treatment, but it is only going to be 30 days, when there isn't anybody who has ever worked with a drug addict who thinks you can even start to make headway in 30 days. I mean, you are just not going to, or 90 days by the time it goes up later.

We are giving a false impression to the whole doggone world that we are just going to do everything for these people on a treatment basis and that we are more compassionate and concerned about it, and yet it is apparent that it is just a facade.

Mr. BROWN. What we are trying to tell the whole world, at least all of America, is that we have a very serious problem in hard-core drug use in this country that is fueling violence. We have to have a comprehensive program to address it. Domestically, our plan calls for enforcement; that is very critical. It calls for prevention; that is very important. It calls for education; that is very important. It also calls for treatment. It also will call for interdiction at our borders. We won't open our borders up for people to bring drugs across. And it calls for an international component as well, so it is comprehensive and it is balanced, but treatment becomes a very, very important component for us.

Senator HATCH. Those are all good calls. They are all general calls; they are generalizations. What I want is how are you going to do it, how are you going to pay for it, how are we realistically going to get after this problem. Everybody would agree with those calls.

Mr. BROWN. Let me repeat what I said earlier, Senator. This committee asked me to come back with an interim strategy. That is what we have before you right now. Come February 1st, you will

have the full-blown strategy that will answer the questions that you are asking me. If there is something you want in the interim that we can't provide for you right now, I will be delighted to make it available for you.

Senator HATCH. But, see, the full-blown strategy was due last February. Now, I admit that was too quick. There is no way you really could do a really comprehensive, full-blown strategy. Here it is now October 1993, a good 7 months later, and frankly we have got an interim strategy that is primarily generalities. Now, again, I don't blame you for that because I think you are hampered. I think you are hamstrung by the way this administration has handled this problem.

My time is up. Nor do I want to lecture you, but the fact of the matter is that I would like to see some specifics and some details and some fleshing-in of how those general things you would like to do can be done. Well, my time is up.

Mr. BROWN. Clearly, we will get that for you. We have complied with the request from this committee to take the time to develop an interim strategy which we have prepared and submitted to you, with the understanding that, come February, we will have our full-blown strategy going into much more detail.

Senator DECONCINI (PRESIDING). Thank you, Senator Hatch.

Dr. Brown, I am surprised you could put this together with the decimation that has occurred in the ONDCP office. It is remarkable, with a reduction from 100-plus FTE's down to 25, that you could put even this strategy together. And I understand that it is an interim strategy, but I have to say to you that I hope that, with commitments from the White House, you can answer the details because I am very fearful that the administration is drifting into a lack of determination in this area. I know you don't agree with that, but that is my observation.

I was critical of the previous administration when Director Martinez ran it because I didn't feel like he had the commitment. I do feel that you have the commitment. But I feel like the White House and the administration do not have the commitment. It became a political office with little or no real emphasis.

Now, you have had an opportunity to visit the southwest border and I would like to have your thoughts on how we should proceed in our effort to combat drug smuggling. What were your observations on the job being done to combat drug smuggling on the southwest border, and do you have any ideas for increasing or improving the antidrug effort there?

Mr. BROWN. I did, certainly, at your suggestion, take the opportunity to visit the southwest border, and indeed I was impressed with the work that is being done there by some dedicated people working in various agencies. Clearly, the assessment is not complete yet. We want to make sure that we have, as I indicated to those I spoke to out there, the best bang for the buck. We do put a lot of resources into interdiction efforts.

The people are working very hard. They are professionals; they are dedicated, they are caring. Indeed, we stop tens of tons of illegal drugs from crossing our border every year. If we did not, those drugs would be on the streets of our cities. It also has an impact upon the drug cartels, in that in order to supply the demand in

America they have to grow and produce twice as much drugs. That is a cost factor.

The drug trafficking organizations are constantly being required to change their operations because of what goes on on the southwest border. Each time we make an arrest, we get more intelligence information to help us. That is why you will find that interdiction on our borders will always be a part of our strategy. The question right now is what works the best. Are there things that are not working that we need to stop doing or modify? That is what we are doing in terms of—

Senator DECONCINI. What is your preliminary observation of the air interdiction program along the border?

Mr. BROWN. That is part of what we think is making a difference. We see that as being a very important component of our battle against bringing drugs in.

Senator DECONCINI. Including the P-3 program?

Mr. BROWN. We think that makes a difference, also.

Senator DECONCINI. The Vice President's National Performance Review recommends the elimination of the P-3 program due to duplication with the Department of Defense. Yet, when I speak to the Department of Defense, they state that this program is not duplicative and have no idea where the recommendations came from. Were you consulted on the recommendations concerning the Customs P-3 program?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

Senator DECONCINI. Do you have any idea where the Vice President's National Performance Review came up with this duplication?

Mr. BROWN. My understanding, in looking at and listening to what occurred there, is the Vice President is looking at how can we, if you would, reinvent Government to save funds, to avoid duplication, and thus have a more streamlined Government that delivers the services with less money.

Senator DECONCINI. You don't think there is duplication in, say, the P-3 air program, do you?

Mr. BROWN. I am not aware of that being duplicative.

Senator DECONCINI. I am not either, and I just wondered if they—

Mr. BROWN. I think the people at SouthCom would tell you that it is a very effective program that they depend upon.

Senator DECONCINI. Exactly, exactly. I know, speaking of SouthCom, you have had an opportunity to visit Panama and to be briefed by General Jaulwan, who is leaving, but he assured me yesterday that his successor is going to be as dedicated as he is. Do you believe that is going to remain part of the strategy, the current effort and initiatives out of SouthCom into some of those host countries?

Mr. BROWN. The Department of Defense is doing a bottom-up assessment of their narcotics effort. I have not seen their final plan. SouthCom does play an extremely important role for Latin America. I had a chance to talk to the General just yesterday and he did do an outstanding job there. He is a very dedicated and truly committed person, and I certainly hated to see him leave, although it is a better opportunity for him. But for our efforts in dealing with the drug problem, I think we have a great loss there.

Senator DECONCINI. Do you think that should continue as part of the strategy? Is that your preliminary observation?

Mr. BROWN. I think the concept has to be there, and whether it is at that location or some other location, I think we have to have that type of support.

Senator DECONCINI. What about the high-intensity drug trafficking areas that are presently in our policy? Do you have any observations whether or not these will continue, and have you given any thought to maybe expanding them into so-called mini-HIDTAs for communities with a continued high rate of drug-related crime, such as was pointed out on some of our charts?

Mr. BROWN. As you know, while serving as the Police Commissioner of New York City, we were part of the HIDTA program and I found it to be a very effective program in bringing together Federal, State and local agencies to address the drug trafficking problem.

Indeed, I think the concept of HIDTA is applicable for those communities that have a very high drug-related violence problem. In fact, I am exploring that possibility right now. I think it makes good sense. The concept worked in the 5 communities where we now have it. I think in terms of knowing that we have serious problems of violence in many of our cities, we are exploring the concept of HIDTA to be applied in those areas as well.

Senator DECONCINI. Dr. Brown, I asked you this question before and it is not to put you or the administration in an embarrassing position, and I support the chairman's and the administration's initiative on community policing. I think it is an investment that is well-founded, and apparently we are going to find the money to do that. Where it comes from still needs to be discussed a great deal.

At the same time, the President's budget that was sent up here—in most law enforcement areas, there were no increases, but reductions in Customs, DEA and ATF. I don't believe the FBI's budget was cut, and there was a stable number for the Border Patrol. Congress has done something here to at least restore, not add, to restore. The Senator from California has been extremely effectively in adding more Border Patrol.

My question is how can we commit to the American public to fund more policemen and then turn around and reduce the amount of police on the Federal level that are dealing with drugs, whether it is on the border or any place else?

Mr. BROWN. I have a two-part answer. Number one, you mentioned the community policing and, as you know, I am a very strong supporter of that.

Senator DECONCINI. So am I.

Mr. BROWN. I have seen it work in New York City when I was the police commissioner there. After 1 year, we saw crime go down in that city in every indexed category. That had not happened in the history of that city. As you also know, when the budget was put together for the fiscal year that you are referring to, I was not in office. I am now in office and I intend to use my good office to address the problems of drug control throughout the whole spectrum.

Senator DECONCINI. That is encouraging, and I take it from your statement that you intend to have your imprint here as much as

you can. If there is a contradiction here, as I think there is, you are going to fight to minimize or eliminate that contradiction, not ask for police and then cut police?

Mr. BROWN. You can be assured of that.

Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, my time is about up, but I want to say, that there has been nobody more of an advocate of this office than you. Chairman Biden started this whole process, I believe, at the time with Senator Laxalt back in the Reagan administration, it is my recollection, to create this so-called drug czar. The original legislation was truly a drug czar crafted by Senator Biden that gave immense authority, I thought rightfully so. There was a real resistance in the administration, and I might recall I believe there was a resistance in the Carter administration as well, and a compromise was put together.

I, for one, am very dubious about reauthorizing this without legislation either introduced by Senator Biden or myself or others who want to truly legislate authority and jurisdiction into the Director of ONDCP. Authorization to leave it like it is, to me, would be difficult to justify. Though some of these things can be done by executive order, it seems to me it is time for the Congress to decide whether or not we really want a drug czar. We haven't had one. We have had perhaps, not to demean the rank of sergeant in the military, but a drug sergeant, instead of a general or a czar or someone who could usurp it themselves.

The only authority I see that you have really is reviewing the budgets of the agencies and slowing that down and perhaps disagreeing with them. But outside of that, directing anybody to do something in the area of drug enforcement, treatment, or education seems to be not there and a necessity if we are going to attempt to have a real strategy and your leadership to do this.

I have confidence in you, Dr. Brown, that if the Biden legislation had been passed or if we pass something really strengthening this, you will take the initiative and use it to the maximum. But you are in a very difficult position with not enough authority, and I consider not enough support from the administration, even under executive orders, to carry out what is minimally necessary in the war on drugs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Specter?

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Brown, at the outset I express my agreement with what Senator DeConcini has said, making it a bipartisan concern, if not criticism, about the lack of determination. This I would apply to both parties and administrations that are both Republican and Democrat.

I recall Senator DeConcini's reference to Senator Biden's push for legislation to establish a drug czar which was passed in 1982, and we sent to President Reagan a 7-part crime package which included the armed career criminal bill which I had sponsored. That package was vetoed by President Reagan, and I recall distinctly in January of 1983 a meeting at the White House to try to persuade

President Reagan to change his view and to sign that legislation. We have not made any progress, or not much progress, since.

I believe a starting point involves the allocation of funds, and when you say that the conference committee increased the funding for drug treatment, you are correct, but, candidly, that is not to the credit of the administration, which had cut that funding. That increase was done in the conference committee of Labor, Health, Human Resources and Education, where I am the ranking Republican. So, notwithstanding what the administration has said, when it came to the funding, it was cut and Congress increased it.

There is something in the range of \$13 billion allocated for drug treatment, and you and I discussed this question when we talked in advance of your confirmation about a change in priorities. I discussed this with Attorney General Janet Reno and got what I thought was a favorable response.

The Congress has passed a sense of the Congress resolution to change the allocation from $\frac{2}{3}$ on enforcement and $\frac{1}{3}$ on education and rehabilitation to an even 50-50 split. But when the administration had submitted its budget, it is still $\frac{2}{3}$ on enforcement and $\frac{1}{3}$ on education and rehabilitation, and a significant amount of the enforcement continues to be on international interdiction which has not been successful in the overall picture.

We have stopped drugs from coming into the country, but based upon the amount which continues to be grown and continues to come in, I think it is a fair conclusion and a consensus conclusion that interdiction is not worth the money that we are spending on it.

Now, if you want to have money for education, rehabilitation, and fighting street crime, let me ask you a very direct question. Why don't you take the bull by the horns and press to have a 50-50 split between enforcement, on the one hand, and education and rehabilitation on the other hand?

Mr. BROWN. As you know, I was not involved in the budget you are referring to. I will be involved in the budget that is being developed right now. What we are in the process of doing, following the submission of our interim strategy, is to meet with the various agencies. The strategy becomes our road map for developing a budget.

My approach is to have policy developed first and let budget follow that, and so the whole objective is to outline where we want to go, then develop budgets around that, not vice versa.

Senator SPECTER. Dr. Brown, you and I talked months ago. You are a very experienced professional. You have been the police chief of major American cities. You know this field intimately. Are you in a position to express a judgment that at least some funding on enforcement ought to give way to additional funding on rehabilitation and education?

Mr. BROWN. As we have pointed out and as I have stated here all morning, we intend to place a stronger emphasis on the demand side. That means education, prevention, and treatment.

Senator SPECTER. More money on the split?

Mr. BROWN. I have not dealt with the split because my approach is to develop the policy and then we will develop the budget, not vice versa, not develop the budget and then try to fit policy into

the budget. I think it is better public policy if you have your policies set out first and then develop your budget.

Senator SPECTER. Well, I can't agree with you about that because we have been talking about this for years with this administration and prior administrations, and we have been talking with you about it for months. I do not think that it is realistic to get more results on rehabilitation and education unless we are prepared to just allocate more money there, and it has to come from somewhere in this \$13 billion budget. That is a lot of money in any circumstance.

I would ask you to focus on that question and give the committee as early a response as you can. It may be that we will have to go item by item on the line next year and set the funding ourselves. So if you would advise us of that, I would appreciate it.

Mr. BROWN. I will be glad to.

Senator SPECTER. Let me turn for a moment or two to the issue of prosecution. I believe that the prosecution aspect is very important, but there has to be a balance with rehabilitation. We have too long put too much money into police and not enough into job training and education. We turn out functional illiterates, addicts without a trade or a skill who are released from jail and return to a life of crime.

But on the prosecution line, this committee initiated a good model in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which established a coordinated task force task force to work under the armed career criminal bill and to work on taking over drug prosecutions in big cities.

I have met periodically with the U.S. Attorneys in Pennsylvania and did so during the recent change in Philadelphia where U.S. Attorney Michael Stiles is taking over from U.S. Attorney Michael Rotko. We met with the 10 local district attorneys—two were absent, actually—from the counties within Eastern District. One issue has been having the U.S. Attorney take over selected State prosecutions. It has been really remarkable that on street arrests, I am told by the police officials that the people arrested, who are not rocket scientists, are telling the arresting officers this is a State case, this is not a Federal case. But U.S. Attorneys' Offices are having a problem under the hiring freeze because there are not sufficient prosecuting attorneys to take over more of these cases from the States.

If you take a city like Philadelphia, which I know intimately, there is a total collapse of the criminal justice system, and I think this is duplicated in the court systems of other big cities. The Federal Government has joint jurisdiction and it really is more a Federal matter because it comes in international trafficking and it comes in interstate commerce.

I would like your views and your help on trying to put some of this funding for the prosecuting attorneys who can handle arrests which have been made in large numbers by Federal, State and local law enforcement officials.

Mr. BROWN. I certainly share your concern. If law enforcement goes out and does the job they are supposed to do and arrests these people who are trafficking in drugs, it certainly makes sense that

they should be prosecuted. I will take the issue you have raised with me and go back and get back to you with a response.

Senator SPECTER. The final question I have concerns your strategy on page 9 that says that drug treatment will be part of a basic health care package. Now, that would be wonderful if it is realistic. We have not yet seen the legislation. Every day, we see some changes in the proposal.

My question is how much would it cost to have drug treatment as part of a national health care package, and is it realistic to expect it to be included in such legislation?

Mr. BROWN. It is realistic to expect it to be included in the legislation. I am not prepared to tell you the cost figure at this point in time. What is being proposed in the President's health care reform package is to have substance abuse treatment as part of the national health care system.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We want to help you here on this committee. We really know the problem and have worked with it for a long time. Senator Cohen is a former prosecuting attorney. Chairman Biden has had extensive experience. Senator Feinstein was the mayor of a big city with a problem. We really want to help you, so we are glad to see you in the job and we want to work with you.

Mr. BROWN. I appreciate that. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feinstein?

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Since we are both newcomers to Washington, I would kind of like to speak just personally and directly to you, Mr. Brown, because I think you have got a hard job, and let me suggest some things that I think are important, not as somebody that has seen the drug czar from Washington but somebody that has watched from afar.

I think your ability to make a personal crusade, to be a table-pounder, and to really be strong on what you believe is ultimately going to determine your success or failure. This Nation has never really fought drugs on either the supply or the demand side. I would like to see a plan that devotes it 50-50 for the first time in history that says we are going to do both; we are not going to do one or the other, we are going to do both, and we are going to do it right and we are going to have a 50-percent allocation of funds to each, demand and supply.

I would like to see a plan that recognizes that we get to our kids too late, that the time to get to them is grade 4, and whether it is Just Say No or Project DARE or anything else, a program has to be in place by the fourth grade in every school in this Nation. By middle school, it is too late. We have lost them, and I have seen that happen chapter and verse all over California.

I would like to see a plan that says to every crack-addicted mother out there, you are going to be eligible for help to get you off crack because if you go ahead and you deliver a baby, the chances are that baby is going to be central nervous system-damaged. And, taxpayer, the chances are that that baby is going to cost you \$250,000 just to get out of a premature unit. So anyone who is

crack-addicted who is pregnant right away comes to the attention and is able to get medical care.

I think that Mr. Bennett did a very good job, and I think that the casual use statistics reflect that someone was listening out there, but unfortunately they were the casual users, not the hard-core drug users. Now, let me talk for a moment about the hard-core drug users and where I think there is a strength in the Federal system.

One of the biggest problems in hard-core drug user areas of our cities is fear that the good people lose their power, the bad people gain power, the curtains go down. And the minute somebody is picked up, they are back on the streets an hour later. Who is that got me? I am going to get them. In the Federal system, they are picked up and there is no bail. That is a strength of our system and we ought to see how it can be replicated. Six weeks later there is a trial; they are convicted and they go. There has to be certainty with respect to sale of drugs in this country and there isn't.

Second, I don't think you can treat people in many of our hard-core user communities. They are gang-dominated. You can't even get through one territory to the other if you are one of the people affected. I think we have got to find ways to develop residential programs which can get people out of their communities, and I would like to submit to you—and I would like you to invite you to visit them with me—that there are programs that don't take a dime of Federal drug monies that are, I think, the most effective in treating the hard-core drug user and one of them is Delancey Street in San Francisco. They deal with the bottom of the barrel, the hard-core drug user. That individual makes a commitment of years to a program.

They have just now bought the midtown Hilton in Los Angeles and are opening a major program, a big program, for hard-core drug users. These people work, they support themselves. They have built their own apartments in San Francisco. They operate restaurants, moving companies, et cetera, and they are able to break through. There are other programs that also work, and I would like to see your final program with a compendium of the finest drug treatment programs in this country and why they work. We need to know why something works and those things that work need to be replicated.

Let us talk for a moment about cocaine and interdiction and where the big coke producers are getting a lot of their chemicals. I would like to see an analysis of that in your report and how we can stop supplying some of the cartels with some of these chemicals. Some of our biggest American companies, I am told, produce some of them. Maybe there is another way of making this more difficult. You know for sure, if some of these chemicals in large quantities are going even to Brazil, the chances are probably that they are going to Colombia one way or another and we ought to stop it.

I also visited on our border an amazing thing, and that was a 65-foot-deep tunnel that went over a mile long which was air-conditioned and electrified from the inside of one building on one side of the border to the inside of another building on the other side of the border to bring drugs back and forth. So we know they are coming in in huge quantities, and I think those things that you do

to interdict that are important and must continue. So I certainly would support continued efforts along those lines.

But I think early education, rehabilitation that involves residential treatment for the hard-core user, no bail wherever you can—when you arrest the dealer, he goes in and he stays in—a 50-50 split of dollars, education, and treatment are some specifics that I would really like to see in a final drug plan. I am terribly afraid that we are losing this battle. I tend to think, with a lot of the older addicts, it is too late and what I worry so deeply about is our kids.

I want to end with one thing. When I was mayor, I took about a dozen kids who were in the drug market out at Bay View Hunter's Point and offered them jobs in the mayor's office. Within a week, a few had dropped out because they found they could make more money selling than they could working. I followed those kids. The only time there was a successful rehabilitation was when we could get the youngster out of the community into another community, out of the school and into a different one, and then hook that youngster up with a lifeline, a mentor, someone that could offer them the way out because that youngster could never have found the way out themselves. The pressures of the community were so over-bearing and the peer pressure so over-bearing that unless you can take the youngster out, it is very hard to make a dent.

I would very much appreciate any comments, since nobody else has really observed the red light, on what I have had to say.

Senator COHEN. Senator Feinstein, I have been observing the red light for a long time over here. [Laughter.]

Senator FEINSTEIN. Can he just respond? I am sorry.

Mr. BROWN. I think you will find that almost all of the issues that you have raised will be contained in our final strategy. Many of them are in our interim strategy. We believe that there must indeed be a crusade to address this issue, and I intend to lead that crusade throughout this country to make sure that all Americans understand the seriousness of the problem, the depth of the problem, and the death and misery and despair that comes out of the drug problem.

Indeed, we have to address our young people. In fact, our plan calls for kindergarten through 12th grade, starting as early as that. In fact, we go beyond that. We say we should start at zero to 3 because those are really the formative years of our young people. So that will be a very important part of what we are about.

We will target for treatment purposes the crack-addicted mother because we know the consequences. I have visited the hospitals. I have seen the babies that were born to crack-addicted clinging to their lives, and I think it is very important that we do that. We don't know yet the consequences of this phenomenon where addicted women are giving birth to babies—the educational consequences, the health consequences. We still don't know all of that at this point in time, but it certainly has to be a major priority.

I was very pleased to see that we have seen a significant reduction in the casual drug use because, as you know, most of our hard-core drug users started off as casual drug users. I applaud the efforts of many people, the neighborhood groups, the many coalitions we have throughout the country working at the grass-roots level to

make a difference. I applaud the efforts of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America for their advertising and raising funds and doing all the things that they do. I applaud the efforts of Drugs Don't Work for going into the workplaces. We want to continue all of that as part of our overall strategy.

The whole issue of treatment has to, again, be a very important part of what we are about. I do visit treatment programs as I travel throughout the country. I was in Oklahoma last week and went to a residential treatment program that was essentially what you are describing. It is not in the city, but out where people can be away from the environment that probably started the problem to begin with.

I have talked to gang members and ex-gang members and they are very clear that if you don't do something to change the environment, it is kind of like taking the fish out of polluted water, putting that fish in clean water, then putting it back in the polluted water. You have not achieved your objective. So what you have described is certainly what we will be advocating for treatment. In fact, I am making plans to come and visit Delancey Street. I have heard a lot about it and what it is doing. I will let you know when I make that visit. I do want to do that.

On cocaine interdiction, we do have to make sure we have an effective interdiction program. My objective is to determine what works. If it is working, we need to continue it. If it is not working, we need to modify it or stop doing it. I saw the same tunnel that you saw when I visited the southwest border. So the whole issue of the chemicals is very critical because you are probably right. Many of them do come from our large companies. It is a problem not only in America, but also for other countries. We are looking at how do we develop relationships with some of the European countries because the chemicals come from there. Our ships there then go to the cocaine-producing countries.

So the issues that you raised, I think, are very critical and they are very much on target to my thought process and how do we deal with this problem, and it is very wise advice and I appreciate it. Clearly, it demonstrates that you have had the experience of dealing with the problems at the local level. That is where the problem is located.

Just as I have dealt with the problem in large cities, you have had the same experience, and it makes a difference when you see the problem firsthand on the streets of our cities.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cohen? Would you turn on the red light for Senator Cohen? [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MAINE

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. For those of you in the audience who have been watching this lighting system, it is really quite fascinating. Number one, the green light goes on after Senator Biden makes his 5-minute presentation, and then after the green light goes off, the yellow light and the green and the red light never go on again during the entire proceeding.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, you will get a chance to run that clock in 20 years or so. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. Well, we may get a chance by the end of next year; you can't tell.

Dr. Brown, Senator Biden made an important statement when he talked about what has taken place in the last few years. At one time, people would run up to you, put a gun to you and say, "I want your money," and then leave. Now, they are taking your money and your life.

In your judgment, as a former police commissioner and someone who has recognized skills in this field, are drug addicts committing crime because they need money to buy more drugs or are they committing crime because they are either sociopaths or simply pathologically disposed to do so?

Mr. BROWN. There are a variety of reasons why they are doing it. If I reflect back on the time when I worked undercover narcotics back in 1960 in San Jose, CA, I went undercover and worked buying narcotics so we could arrest the people who were selling them. As I reflected back, I never worried about my own personal safety because we did not have the proliferation of guns on the streets in the cities.

Today, I worry about every cop who goes out there in the streets because of the guns on the streets and the lack of value on human life. What we have seen happen is a cultural acceptance of violence in all too many parts of our cities. People see violence as being a fact of life, and there are many reasons for that. There is some research that shows that violence through the media contributes to aggression, and thus ends up in violence among our young people.

We find that some of the shootings are war over turf, drug dealers fighting, and all too often an innocent child gets caught up in that gun fire. We find that a major problem is the possession of handguns. We know from a psychological standpoint that if people get into an argument, there is a tendency to use the level of power at their disposal. If the gun is there, then that is what they are going to use.

Senator COHEN. I want to play the devil's advocate just for a moment and say let us assume that they are primarily committing the crimes—I am talking about violent crimes now, turf wars, armed robberies, and so forth—to feed their habit. What if you took the profits out of the drug trade?

It is a growing sentiment of people, or a growing chorus, I should say, that says just legalize drugs take the profit out, make them available to the people who want them and treat the people who have been addicted. What, in your judgment, would that do to the level of violent crime? As you have indicated before, we have had guns since our history began.

Mr. BROWN. But to the degree that we have right now.

Senator COHEN. Yes, the difference is the combination of guns and the drugs. Now, assume you took the profit out of drug-dealing. What, in your judgment, would that do in terms of crime in the streets?

Mr. BROWN. I think it would be a terrible, terrible, terrible mistake to legalize illegal drugs in America. The consequences would be so severe. If we look at the plight of many of our young people,

particularly in our inner-cities, and our disadvantaged citizens right now, it is such that I think it would not be an exaggeration to say that the legalization of illegal drugs would be the moral equivalent to genocide. It would be the pathway to the destruction of our country.

We have to ask some very serious questions. What do we legalize—heroin, cocaine, PCP, LSD? What about young kids that now are 6, 8 years old that are on drugs? Do we give them drugs for the rest of their lives? What about the crack babies?

I think anyone who looks at the drug issue as being an issue of victimless crimes is mistaken, terribly mistaken. Visit a crack house and you see the degradation of humanity like you have never seen before. Visit a hospital and see a baby that is born to a crack-addicted mother. Go to the hospital emergency rooms and you see the shooting of victims who come in, often innocent people. Look at what would happen to your medical health costs. Look at what happens in terms of your educational costs.

We can go on and on, but I think the bottom line is——

Senator COHEN. I want you to go on and on because it is an issue that has been raised and it is important that the people who are watching hear what you are saying.

Mr. BROWN. Just take any community, probably any community in America, and look at what goes on in some neighborhoods. People can't sleep. Some sleep in bathtubs because of the shooting that takes place. Innocent people are killed because of these shootings. It all comes about because of drugs, but to suggest that legalization of illegal drugs would solve the problem—there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that. Even those who are advocates of the legalization of drugs will admit that it would mean more drug use than we have right now. More people would use drugs.

I believe that the fact that we have seen a reduction in casual drug use is because the use of drugs is illegal, so that has to also be taken into consideration. My message to anyone who raises the issue is that we can't wave the white flag, we can't surrender. I say if a person has a problem, let us help them with the problem. If they sell drugs, let us arrest them, put them in jail and get them off the streets of our cities.

Senator COHEN. In looking at that chart that we have up across the room over there, have you found that the percentages of heavy users and casual users are, in any way, related to economic status? In other words, do heavy users tend to come from the lower socioeconomic status, so that they are either trying to find their way out of poverty by selling drugs or find their way out of misery by using them?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, we know where most of the heavy users are. They are generally within our inner cities and are mostly disadvantaged citizens. As we talk to people who are involved in the problem, one of the major issues that I see is the whole atmosphere of hopelessness, no prospect of a job, no prospect of meaningful employment. The socioeconomic problems that we are all aware exist in too many of our inner cities are the driving forces behind the continuous use of drugs, for whatever reason. That is why our strategy tries to address that as an issue.

Senator COHEN. There has been a lot of discussion about reinventing Government, that wonderful phrase that has been used and over-used. One of the proposals in Vice President Gore's NPR study is the merger of the DEA and FBI.

On the one hand, you have DEA officials saying that is a bad idea. Once we lose the focus of a single agency that is dedicated to drug interdiction and fighting drugs, we will lose our effectiveness. The FBI, by contrast, says, well, we can't in any way yield any of our territory to DEA or to any other agency without losing our effectiveness.

I would like to know what is your own assessment concerning the merger of the FBI and the DEA.

Mr. BROWN. I believe that the answer has to come from what is best for this country in terms of its drug control efforts. I believe we should have an agency that has as a single mission the enforcement of our narcotics laws.

Senator COHEN. Have you talked to Attorney General Reno recently?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, I have.

Senator COHEN. Does she support that view as well?

Mr. BROWN. The last time I talked to her about it, she had not made up her mind yet. If we read the paper, today's paper suggests she has reached the same conclusion.

Senator COHEN. Senator Biden and I have worked—and I would like to commend Senator Biden for really supporting this initiative. He was responsible for helping to get through the so-called Counter-Drug Technology Assessment Center, or CTAC. I was wondering, as we look at the cut in on DCP staff from 146 people down to 25, how many of those were CTAC people?

Mr. BROWN. Currently, we have 4 involved in that research operation, so there are 4.

Senator COHEN. Four left or you have four involved?

Mr. BROWN. Four left.

Senator COHEN. How many were cut?

Mr. BROWN. I don't think any were cut.

Senator COHEN. So you only had 4 to begin with?

Mr. BROWN. None were cut.

Senator COHEN. Do you think that this particular center is going to be useful in this effort in the war on drugs?

Mr. BROWN. Well, no doubt about it. We need to use technology as a means of addressing the drug problem. We need to take advantage of technology that has been developed in other places like our Department of Defense and see how we can apply that technology to addressing the problems of drug trafficking in this country, and indeed drug use as well. It is a very important center and certainly has my total support.

Senator COHEN. Well, the use of radio chemistry to image the brain for substance abuse patients has been researched. Also, there is a lot of research on cocaine antibodies. I hope that is going to continue.

Finally, I see the red light is on and I am going to follow suit and just ask one more very quick question.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead, Senator.

Senator COHEN. You indicated that we need to punish individuals, but fairly, effectively, and have those sentences enforced. In your judgment, have the courts been imposing fair sentences?

Mr. BROWN. All too often, there is no risk for committing the crimes right now. Our prisons are overcrowded. There is a revolving door, and in many places there is a mockery of the criminal justice system as a result of that. So what we have to do is make sure that if a person deals in drugs and commits a crime that there is certainty of punishment. That is the approach that we want to take, make sure that even on the first encounter there is a risk to committing the crime. That is extremely important.

Senator COHEN. What about mandatory sentencing?

Mr. BROWN. That is an issue that we are looking at right now for more than one reason, one being that our prisons are overcrowded by people who are using or trafficking in drugs. Also, I think it has a very serious social impact in terms of the disparity that it brings about. As you know, a large number of the people who use crack cocaine are minorities, African Americans. The majority of those who use powder cocaine are white, and mandatory minimum sentencing as passed by the Congress called for different levels of punishment based upon the type of substance you use.

If you use crack cocaine, you go to prison. If you use powder cocaine, you can get probation. The end result, though not intended, has resulted in a disparity in the race of people who are going to prison.

Senator COHEN. Does one form of cocaine produce more violent behavior than the other?

Mr. BROWN. Well, there are some suggestions that crack cocaine may very well create a different response.

Senator COHEN. So there would there be any rational justification for having different sentencing for different types of use, or do you think we should just have one uniform sentence?

Mr. BROWN. I think we have to take a very close look at right now and determine what is the best policy because I am sure that the intent was not to create the results that we see right now.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Doctor, it is 1:00 and we are going to let you go. Let me just say two brief things. One, we would like to invite you back—I know you will come back—as we put some flesh on the bones of the skeleton that you have submitted here today as to the pieces of your strategy.

Dr. Bennett and I, and he is about to testify, found ourselves in league on a number of things, one of which was the topic that you have just spoken to and that Senator Cohen has raised, and that is this notion of legalization of drugs. I think the statement you made today is very important. I would just like to point out several very important things.

One, places where it has been tried, it has not worked. The rationale is to take the profit out of the drug business, thereby breaking up the cartels and organized crime units that thrive on it, as well as the entrepreneurs. But the implications are overwhelming, and all those who support it acknowledge, that the pool of consumers increases significantly.

With the increase of the pool, what will happen is there will still be a black market in the trading of and the selling of drugs. The profit margin will be less. The need to increase the market of those who consume will be much higher. So the profit ultimately will be maintained at where it is or close to where it is.

The violence flows on the cocaine front from the consumption and the over-consumption. The experiments show in laboratory experiments—they did one that I think is astounding. They put rats in a cage. They gave them a little button they pushed with their nose to get food and a button they pushed where they could get unlimited cocaine. They literally starved themselves to death; they never pushed the button for food. That is how the body works, that is how the mind works, that is how human beings work. I have not found an addict whom we have ever heard from or about that has been satisfied with yesterday's high. It is always the next high in order to increase it, so it is an escalating consumption.

Last, even if all of the above were not true, who is going to supply these drugs? The cost of supplying would not be a \$13 billion antidrug effort. It would be tens of billions of dollars purchasing of the products, whether they are synthetic or whether they are natural products grown; that is, poppy and/or coca leaf. I am not sure the American public understands what that cost would be when they flirt with the notion of legalization.

I can't fathom the Andean growers saying, by the way, you know, they have now legalized in the United States, so why don't we lower our price for them; let us just get that price on down there so more people can consume it earlier. So for a whole range of reasons the point you made is valid and I think we are going to have to continue to make it.

I thank you. We promised you we would get you out at 1:00. It is now 1:04. It is later than we promised. I hope you will be prepared to come back as we go into more detail, and I hope you catch your flight.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be back whenever you ask me to. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very, very much.

Our next witness is William J. Bennett. Dr. Bennett was the first Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, serving from March 1989 until November 1990. Dr. Bennett served the Reagan administration as Secretary of Education. Today, Dr. Bennett is the Co-Director of Empower America. His voice is still being heard as forcefully and as loudly and with as much conviction as we heard it when he was the first director.

I welcome you back, Mr. Secretary. It is a pleasure to have you here, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BENNETT, CO-DIRECTOR, EMPOWER AMERICA, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. It is a pleasure to be back. I will be brief. You have already had extensive discussion. I first of all want to thank you for your kind remarks about me. Thank you, and Lee Brown and Senator Feinstein. All the kindest remarks came from Democrats. I don't know what that

tells me. Maybe it is that old line from Shakespeare: he is good being gone. In any case, I thank you.

I will be brief. Let me just lay it out on the table. That is the way you and I have been talking to each other for years. I am very glad you are here. I am very glad Senator DeConcini is here, and Senator Feinstein and Senator Hatch and Senator Cohen, because I really don't think there is anybody home up the street.

There is in this strategy, I am sorry to say, no real philosophy. There is no evidence of commitment or very much involvement. There is no theory, there is no practice. Essentially, I think this administration has done a no-show on this issue. The neglect is real and it is not benign. I think Lee Brown is a very decent man. Everything you said about him is absolutely right in terms of experience and know-how, and he may have a seat at the Cabinet table, but he is an orphan.

There was a lot we did that you agreed with. There was some we did that you didn't agree with. We had some, I think, very engaging conversations about it, but I think you would agree that we were there and it is important for the President to be there on this issue. In his absence, I am glad that you and some of the other members of the committee are there.

In the absence of any serious effort at a drug strategy from the administration, I would, if it is all right with you, just prefer to deal briefly with your suggestions and Senator Hatch's and Senator Feinstein's, which much more closely resemble a serious attempt at a strategy.

First of all, on the money point, I guess I might take some issue with you and at least ask a question. I would just ask you, in conscience, to consider this. If we had come up here with a drug strategy in 1, 2, or 3 years and said, Senator Biden, we think this is a very compelling problem, but the budgetary constraints are very real and we are not asking for any more money, I think you would have killed us on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You are right.

Mr. BENNETT. Yes, and so I think the same standard ought to apply. You know, I am always eager to help with suggestions, but I am sure others have their suggestions, too. I think the line of questioning that preceded today and the suggestions that came out—and I think some consensus did come out—suggested areas where you simply need to put more money into it. I am a conservative Republican, but I think there are certain areas where you have got to spend more money, the Federal Government has got to spend it, and they are in those areas that you outlined earlier. Let me get to some of them.

Before I do, let me say a word about interdiction. I wouldn't accept the notion of cutting interdiction so quickly. I think it is very, very important that people recognize nothing works a hundred percent in this business. Treatment doesn't work a hundred percent, local law enforcement doesn't work a hundred percent, work in source countries doesn't work a hundred percent, interdiction doesn't work a hundred percent.

Yes, there is a lot of cocaine in the cities of America. There could be more. There could be even more, even a lot more, and if you stop interdiction there will be a lot more. So I just introduce that cau-

tion. I don't think that is the right tradeoff, interdiction for more treatment. I think you keep your interdiction, maybe you even increase your interdiction, and increase treatment as well.

Your comment about more community policing, I agree with, Senator Hatch. More community policing will require more police, and I think this came across in Senator DeConcini's questioning. You don't pick up more police with one hand and then cut State and local law enforcement with the other and think you have solved the problem. But your point about the cities throughout this morning, I think, is exactly right, and Lee Brown knows that and Lee Brown, after all, has experience with that.

Another theme this morning was treatment, and the importance of compulsory treatment came up three times, I think, as I heard it—Philadelphia, Janet Reno's drug courts in Miami, and I always think of the Maricopa County folks, do drugs or do time. That compulsory treatment idea is a very good one, but remember the other side of that compulsory treatment idea. The idea is you go into treatment or you go to jail. So when one says let us do less jail and more treatment, remember the formula here is you do treatment or you go to jail. You have got to have real jails and real jail cells and spaces. Otherwise, the threat is not real.

I think throughout this business we know that whether you are talking about big-time drug dealers or small-time drug dealers, they know that the threat of imprisonment today is less than it was, and we can cite those numbers from a number of contexts. I agree with you about treatment of prison and the importance of it and the need to do more of it.

Juvenile justice—this is a general area reform in the criminal law that is required. I don't think anything better dramatizes it than the recent cases in Florida. The age of these children in Florida who were alleged to have committed these crimes, 13- and 14-year olds, with 15 priors—you have got State laws that say they can't do more than 6 months' time. We have juvenile justice laws in this country that were written for the time of "Ozzie and Harriet" and we are now in the era of—I don't want to give that show any more publicity than it has already had on TV, but there a lot of shows showing young people engaging in criminal behavior. That is the era we are living in now.

A word about law enforcement, a word about the focus that you recommend, Mr. Chairman, and others, on the hard-core user. To put together the hot spot of this problem, it is a combination of the hard-core user and America's cities. My recommendation to you is that one thing I would put at the top of the list is we have to close down the open-air drug markets. You and I have been talking about this for 3 or 4 years.

One of the main differences between the suburbs and the inner cities is that you don't have open-air drug markets in the suburbs. You do have them in the cities. Again, quite apart from any analyses or studies that are done, you know, because I have reported it to you before, when you go to those cities—southwest Los Angeles or New York City or any place—and talk to the people who live there who are trying to make their way, the first they ask you is, you know, why can't you close down these markets, why can't you

keep these people off the streets. The answer to both questions is the same.

I was going to make another point about prisons, but I think I have already made it.

Two last points. I would ask you, Mr. Chairman—this is partly sentiment, not sentimental, but sentiment. You and I went through a long and elaborate exercise about the Office of National Drug Control Policy, how important it was, the functions it was to perform. I will admit some of it I went through somewhat grudgingly. I wasn't all that pleased about all of that, but it was a condition of my taking the job that I understood and that you and I had an understanding, and other members of the committee had the same understanding about what that job should do, and we did. We had a meeting of the minds and I think it actually worked.

As you know, on a number of occasions we didn't certify budgets for other departments. We had some fights with some fairly major departments and we went to the White House and we won, and we established our turf and our turf was to be the arbiter of other people's turf. I was very pleased about that. It worked.

All I can say is look at what they have done to your office, look at what they have done to this idea. They have destroyed it, and it is a shame; it really is a shame because I think it did show on a number of occasions that it was working and there were a lot of good ideas behind that office.

The last point is we talked about correlations between drug use and crime, heavy drug use and crime. There are a lot of correlations around, and all I would suggest—I know you all talk to each other, but it seems to me other hearings that are going on under the auspices of Senator Moynihan are also very important where we are talking about social pathologies of various sorts.

One needs to link not only drug use and crime, but the decomposition of the inner city—75-percent out-of-wedlock birth rates in our cities, the absence of fathers, all sorts of problems which are, I think, eating at the heart of America and destroying American cities. The index of leading cultural indicators that I put out and sent to you has a whole array of these numbers and statistics, but I think that although we should never use the question of root causes as an excuse not to act now on fronts that we know can give us some results, we also know, I think, that the main remedy for most of what ails us is to grow more civilized and to remember that the character-forming institutions of families, churches and schools are, in the end, the answer.

Thank you, sir. It is good to be back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bennett follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BENNETT

I. INTRODUCTION

- September 5, 1989 address by President Bush on illicit drugs—"the gravest threat facing our Nation today."
- Four years ago, more than 14 million Americans were current active users of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin.
- Nearly 2 million adolescents were using drugs.
- Nation's response to drug crisis during 1980's was not always well-coordinated—overlapping responsibilities for law enforcement, interdiction, demand reduction.

II. WHAT A REAL DRUG STRATEGY DID

- September 1989 Strategy and each succeeding strategy grounded on four key principles which made explicit the Bush Administration's understanding of nature of our Nation's drug problem:

1. Essence of drug problem is drug use. Ultimate goal must be to reduce number of Americans who use drugs. Too little attention had been given to such indicators of drug use as drug-related deaths, injuries, and levels of drug use among various populations.

2. Because they are at the heart of the problem, drug users must be held accountable. Although many reasons are given for it, drug use is by and large the result of bad decisions by individuals exercising free will. Need to make it clear that using drugs will lead inevitably to specific adverse consequences and sanctions. Consequences may range from civil and criminal penalties, from loss of professional license to court-ordered drug treatment, as well as social sanctions from family, community.

3. To be effective, Nation's anti-drug efforts must integrate efforts to reduce the supply of as well as the demand for illegal drugs. To be fully effective, prevention and treatment programs need support of programs to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs.

Supply reduction effort contributes directly to reducing demand for illegal drugs in two ways:

By discouraging use through threat of apprehension and punishment, and

By directing substance-dependent individuals who enter criminal justice system to undertake and complete treatment programs.

4. We must have a national, not just a Federal anti-drug effort. Part of the fight involves Federal resources expended by Federal authorities, but an even bigger part of the fight involves Federal, State, local, and non-governmental resources expended by communities, neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and individuals.

- President Bush bolstered National Drug Control Strategy by seeking unprecedented increase in Federal funding for virtually every facet of war on drugs—first budget alone proposed 40 percent increase in funding for drug control programs. Funding for drug programs increased by nearly 80 percent to \$11.9 billion in fiscal year 1993. Funding for domestic law enforcement grew by 90 percent, for internal cooperation and interdiction by 38 percent, and for demand reduction by 99 percent since fiscal year 1989.
- From the first to the fourth and last National Drug Control Strategy, a number of initiatives were launched, including:

Creation of a \$100 million per year grant program to help communities mobilize against drugs.

Increased funding for drug prevention in public housing communities from \$8 million in fiscal year 1989 to \$175 million in fiscal year 1993.

Funding requests that would have doubled Federal funding for school systems ravaged by drugs and drug-related crime.

Doubled funding for drug treatment services and research, and proposed and signed into law legislation that improves state strategic planning for drug treatment systems.

Initiated the development of model drug treatment protocols and standards of care for treatment providers.

Pioneered multi-modality drug treatment campuses and experimental programs integrating drug treatment at Job Corps training centers.

Expanded funding and encouragement for community policing approaches by local law enforcement.

Increased the use of significant elements of the U.S. Armed Forces in the fight against illegal drugs.

Expanded cooperative programs with Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and other source and transit countries.

Increased the use of boot camps and other alternative sanctions for drug offenders.

Greatly increased the eradication of domestically-grown marijuana crops.

III. THE RESULTS

- The only real gauge of how we are doing is the number of Americans using drugs.
- The number of current drug users is now half that in 1979.

- Since 1988, the number of Americans who reported using cocaine within the past month is down by 45 percent. Since 1985, it has declined almost 80 percent.
- Adolescent drug use is now at the lowest level since national data collection began in 1975.
- 1992 data show that there are two distinct fronts in the war on drugs. National Drug Control Strategy was designed to curtail the spread of drug use by dramatically reducing casual use—we have been successful beyond expectation on this front. Hard-core addicted users—those on the second front—now probably constitute over 50 percent of all current drug users.
- Hard-core users are more resistant to conventional anti-drug use measures than casual users—progress in this area will be more difficult as a result. Despite a doubling of Federal treatment funding since 1988, the available evidence indicates the addict population has not declined.

IV. CONCLUSION

- Bill Clinton has been almost silent on this issue; he has not given it a high national priority.
- The Clinton Administration has acquiesced to cuts to all aspects of federal counter-drug effort: almost one-quarter of a billion dollars in drug treatment and prevention spending; \$117 million in funds to state and local law enforcement; \$50 million, or one-third of the funding for the State Department's anti-drug bureau; and an 80 percent cut to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
- Where drug use remains concentrated today, drugs are plentiful and cheap. Interdiction is one way, and in some cases the only proven way, to reduce the availability of illegal drugs.
- Largely as a result of interdiction efforts, cocaine cartels must now produce an estimated 1,100 metric tons of cocaine in order to deliver roughly 300 metric tons to the U.S. market. During 1989–90, interdiction forced street prices up by roughly 50 percent. As a result, use went down, as did cocaine-related hospital emergency room admissions and deaths.
- Loudest criticism of anti-drug efforts is aimed at interdiction and other supply reduction efforts—critics are dead wrong. Hard-core users are more, not less, price sensitive than casual users.
- Treatment is not “the” solution to the drug problem. Although there are some fine treatment programs, there is no evidence that simply expanding drug treatment funding will significantly reduce hard-core use.
- Federal treatment spending roughly doubled during the Bush Administration, increasing by more than one billion dollars per year, and a Census Bureau study of State and local treatment spending shows it increased as well. Despite these increases and sharp declines in new users, the number of addicts did not decline.
- Those serious about fighting addiction and crime in our inner cities will strengthen interdiction along with domestic law enforcement, treatment, and prevention efforts—with real resources and real leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, as usual, for a strong and concise and insightful statement. Let me engage in a little bit of recollection myself here for a moment that does not contradict but just adds to what you have said.

When you and I began this little journey on establishment of this office, we had several advantages. One, the deficit wasn't nearly what it is now. Two, we were in a position where it was a new idea. We were able, through your forceful advocacy, to capture the imagination and concern of the administration, the Congress, and the American people.

As a matter of fact, I remember the first strategy that I wrote up here for the Democrats. Everybody just signed on; no one even asked the number. They didn't even ask me. There was no question. They just voted for it. What is the number again, Joe? How many billion do you want? “X” amount, boom. There was no question.

As our success rates relative to what the public expected, which was an unrealistic expectation—you and I kept cautioning that this was a slow process; it took two decades in the making. In my view, as their expectations were not met—unrealistic, I might add, expectations were not met, support began to wane and other areas began to take precedence, and so people like me who would go to the floor as recently as 2 years ago asking for more revenues to support increased use—not just saying we wanted to increase the deficit, but saying we want to spend more money and here is where I am going to tax you to spend more money, here is where I am going to get more revenues, here is where I am going to cut—we began to lose some consensus.

Third, I would point out that I have been publicly critical of this administration. I do not think they have taken this seriously enough. My hope and expectation, although I admit to you that is all it is at this moment, is that they are just getting to it in terms of their initial priority list. But I can't look you in the eye or the American people and say I know that with certainty.

If they do not get to it, they will have me as as vocal a critic as I was when you left the office. When you left the office, your former boss did just what I believe is happening now. He decided to take this off the screen. He appointed a wonderful man whom nobody listened to. No one paid any attention to him and he was used in a political context as opposed to a substantive context.

But I can't tell you that that trend has changed, other than the changing of putting a real professional in charge. Now, the question is whether the real professional—notwithstanding the change in the assertion that the change in status is one that is reflecting a change from the last drug director, I have yet to see that. I don't see it yet. I acknowledge that.

But let me go specifically to the points you have raised, and the first point was am I applying the same standard. The answer is I am not applying the same standard, in truth, and the reason is the standard has changed because the world has changed in which we are able to get support from Republicans as well as Democrats on the Hill. The attitude toward deficit reduction and across the board cutting everything is a fever pitch here among Democrats and Republicans, unlike what it was in 1989.

Nonetheless, the essence of your criticism, I think, is correct. At a minimum, this administration has not paid enough attention to this problem. At a maximum, it is evidence of a continuation of a Bush strategy, which is if I don't talk about it, it may go away—the Bush strategy in the last 2 years of his administration.

The interdiction that some of us are suggesting we curtail, and I would like you to comment on it, if you will remember you cautioned me against—this is where you were right and I was wrong—you cautioned me against encouraging the Defense Department to get more directly involved in Caribbean interdiction in terms of use of fleets and access to naval vessels, et cetera.

Please correct me if I am wrong. I don't think you were as big a proponent of that as I was. I think I was wrong. I think that portion of the interdiction budget which is the Caribbean interdiction monies, hundreds of millions of dollars that have been spent, has

produced a much lower return for the investment than border interdiction and the Andean strategy has.

So some of us who talk about deemphasis of interdiction are talking primarily about the Caribbean military portion of that interdiction, which adds up to about—we would be cutting it back from something on the order of \$753 million to \$540 million, is what I am talking about.

With regard to community policing—and I am going to run through these and ask you to comment, OK? I will just tick them off.

Mr. BENNETT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to community policing, one of the things we have written into the crime bill, which obviously has not passed—and you know as well as I do how hard it is to pass any crime bill any time, any place, in this place, notwithstanding what the press thinks. That is the one place everyone thinks they are an expert.

If we talk about health care, 70 percent of the Congress will say, well, I am not sure about health care and I have to learn more about it. We talk about anything else and they say, well, I am not sure about NAFTA, I will have to learn. We talk about crime and everybody is an expert. Half of them don't know what in the devil they are talking about. They don't know habeas corpus from *res ipse loquitur*. I mean, they have no notion what is going on, but yet they all have an opinion, which is, you know, appropriate. I am going to pay for having said that, I am sure.

In the community policing provisions in the crime bill, there is a condition that suggests that there must be a maintenance of effort on the part of the State. The State cannot take advantage of these community police, the additional budgetary help and, while doing that, lay off community policing efforts or lay off folks in the police department like happened under CETA years ago in the 1970's.

With regard to treatment, the crime bill and the drug bill that we are going to come up with, whether the administration does or not, is going to provide for compulsory treatment in prisons, but the condition is go to jail or go to treatment. This is not an alternative, and that ties into the notion of why we put boot camps into this.

I want to make it clear, and I want you to comment on it when I finish, that I am not offering boot camps as a way to treat drug addicts and cure them. I am offering boot camps as an alternative to be able to empty State prison systems from the nonviolent offenders and first-time offenders at a much lower cost with the same impact, freeing up prison space in hard-core prisons for hard-core addicts and hard-core offenders and violent offenders who are being let out the back door because 32 States are under a Federal court order.

I, quite frankly, think we don't do enough in terms of being willing to fund a number of prison alternatives for State and local prisons. I don't know whether the staff has a chart of the total number of prisoners in State and Federal prisons. Stick it up while I am talking here. You know these numbers extremely well, Bill, but the point is 95 percent of this problem is at a State and local level, not

at a Federal level. Quite frankly, State and local organizations aren't doing their job. They are simply not being responsible.

Mr. BENNETT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Last, with regard to drug courts, the purpose of drug courts is not for the purpose of avoiding putting people in prison. It is to capture that 600,000 population of drug offenders who are out there who are under probation. If you notice, in total Federal facilities you have roughly 80,000 inmates, and we have prison monies we haven't spent that have been appropriated available to the Federal prison system that can accommodate any of the Federal prison needs up through the year 1996, according to our prison officials.

So the drug courts are designed to deal with, if you will, intensive supervision and diversion from the main prison system of people we still think we have a shot with. But we have no shot with them if we don't put them in treatment and have extensive supervision for them.

The last point is the broadest point. I met with a representative of the Black Caucus, in my view, a very, very experienced and enlightened guy, a guy named Craig Washington from Texas. Craig came over and said to me, hey, Joe, look, your crime bill and the drug approach you are talking about doesn't do all that has to be done.

I said, Craig, let us understand—this is a little truth in advertising—the crime bill is not designed to cover it all by any stretch of the imagination. He said, look, we think we have to do more of what—he didn't use these phrases, but he would if he were here—what Bill Bennett just said. While we are dealing with the product of this neglect—that is, the violence and the offenders—we have to go back and deal with—for example, 31 percent of all the people in that prison system today have had a family member in prison. Thirty-one percent of the people that are presently serving time in prison today had a mother, father, brother, sister, aunt or uncle that is in or was in the prison system.

As you point out, 75 percent, in some localities, of all the children born next year or this year will be born not only without a father, but essentially without a mother after going through the physical labor. Something has to be done. There are a number of programmatic and specific initiatives that deal with the imposition of responsibility. I am sure that you and I and Moynihan will agree on some and we will differ on some, but we have got to get about the business of facing up to the American people.

If they want something done—and this is the last statement I will make—if they want something done, they have got to be prepared to pay for it. For example, I went and made the presentation to the Democratic caucus of the crime bill and they all said, Joe, we have got to do more than what you are proposing in your crime bill, which is one piece of this mosaic of how to deal with violence in America, only a small piece of it.

I said, fine, let me give you the numbers. You can choose from columns A, B, C and D. Column A, for example, is with regard to police; we need more police. Column A gives you, over a 6-year period, 50,000 new police, with a declining match of 75, down to 25, to zero, for States. That costs \$3.9 billion.

Column B is if you want to have 50,000 cops in community policing over 5 years and have the match stay at 75-25 for the first 3. That is \$4.9 billion. If you want to provide 100,000 cops that you all say you want to do, no problem. I will put it in. Total number: \$18.9 billion for that.

The same with drug treatment. Remember, we used to argue about drug treatment. I would say to you, hey, why aren't you doing more? You would look at me and at first you would say, well, it is not very—and if I were in your position I would say the same thing, and also the evidence indicated it at the time—it is not as effective as we think and we don't have the superstructure of people in place to be able to do the treatment, so we have got to build that up.

When you would go down there and say you needed more money for treatment and give them the numbers, they would say, hey, we ain't got that money. Well, I think it is time that you and I and everybody else are flat out honest with the American people. If we want more treatment in prisons, I can give you the number on treatment. If you want to treat everybody in the prison system now that has a drug problem, the number is staggering.

Crack babies—and I know it has been a great concern of yours and a great concern of the Senator from California and myself and Senator Hatch. No problem. There are 300,000 of them. We can go out there, we can treat them. If we treat them all, the number is probably somewhere about \$3 billion a year.

So I think we have just got to ante up with the American people, but what I want you to focus on, if you would, in response to all that I have said, is not at this point whether the administration is doing it right or wrong, but in terms of what we talked about, are we on target, Bill, if we, A, keep the pressure on casual use, but significantly up the pressure on hard-core users; insist on significant increases in drug treatment in an incarcerated setting, because remember the debate used to be that was not of much value—not between you and me, but I mean the debate 10 years ago—and does it make sense for us to increase the number of police on the streets and diversion programs like drug courts, in a generic sense? Do they make sense to deal with the drug problem, to make an impact?

Mr. BENNETT. What are we looking at, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. As long as you want.

Mr. BENNETT. I will be brief on this, though. Let me just respond to your last telescoping of the questions. The answer to all four is yes. Keep the pressure on casual use, which is where we have clearly been successful. Put more pressure on hard-core use, yes, more drug treatment in incarceration, and more police.

The only fact I think I could add to that list is some work by—I know you know John DiJulio, who lives not far from where you are—some of the very recent numbers on the thin blue line getting even thinner. We have been looking for years at the numbers of police in a police department that tell us the LAPD has the smallest number of police in the population for a big city. What we don't look at is the number of police deployed at any given time, and this is critical. How many people are actually out there on the street? This was, of course, the genius of Reuben Greenberg in Charleston,

who got more and more of his men out from behind their desks and out onto the streets.

DiJulio says, and I would take it he knows what he is talking about, that we have actually never tried, in the absence of prisons and jails—just put that aside—we have never tried really saturating really tough, high-intensity areas, drug corners, with all sorts of police, just tons of police, and see what happens. In the absence of building more prisons, what kind of disincentive this creates, I don't know, but that thin blue line, by all evidence, is, as you said this morning, proportional to crime, getting thinner. I think a lot of the American public is familiar with the statistic about there used to be 3 policemen for 1 serious crime, and now it is 3 crimes for each policeman. So, yes, we have got to do something about that.

I just want to deal for a minute with the larger question—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave that point, can I point out that what we do—and I would like your view on it—what we do in the legislation is, in order to qualify for community policing money, to get any of it, you have to have a community policing program, and there is resistance now in many jurisdictions to do what you have suggested and to get people out from behind a desk. A lot of the police organizations aren't crazy about that. A lot of the mayors aren't real crazy about that.

Mr. BENNETT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But to make it clear, to get any of this money for community policing, even to get one cop under this community policing money, you have to have the entire department into community policing, as we define it.

Mr. BENNETT. Right, fair enough, fair enough. On your larger point about budgets and deficits, and so on, and the Caribbean, I think, Senator, you are mistaken about me and the Caribbean. I think I have always been in favor of more deployment of defense—

The CHAIRMAN. OK, well, I am mistaken. I apologize. That means we were both wrong, in my view.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I know. I was going to say you were right and I was wrong, if you had it right, but actually I think it is reversed. In any case, on this question, because it is in the headlines now and it gets me to the larger point I would make, one has to make the case—it is the responsibility of leadership to make the case, let us say, in the Caribbean that it makes more sense to use U.S. resources, military and otherwise, to try to establish a democracy in Haiti than to stop drugs coming into the United States.

If somebody wants to make that case, let us see them make it, but I think if you asked the American people what they think is more critical, I think you would get an answer more toward the latter. Every government, every administration, faces the obligation—and I certainly didn't relieve in my thinking nor do I think in my practice the Bush administration of this, nor would I relieve the Clinton administration of it. You can say that the deficits are more serious, and indeed they are, but this never relieves an administration of the obligation of choosing.

To my mind, the way I studied political theory, governments' first obligations are to governments' first obligations. Government

does not have an obligation, it seems to me, for health care as obvious as it has to the security of its citizens because as I read the Founding Fathers and the Constitution, that is the first obligation of Government—safety. I don't want to get into all the intricacies of health care. What I am saying is you make a list.

The reason I don't have a problem saying, yes, yes, yes, to, I think, everything you said—treatment and cops and prisons—is this is something this conservative understands as the major responsibility of Government. Do the ones you are supposed to do, Government; do the ones you have promised to do and then we can get into the tricky ones of health care and OSHA and running school systems. Do the first one first, so I don't think one is relieved from that responsibility either by a deficit or anything else. In fact, I think the fact of a deficit or a larger deficit ought to concentrate the mind even more to sort out those priorities. But, yes, I would agree on your points of emphasis in terms of where we ought to go, and I would agree with you more money ought to go there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Hatch?

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the committee, Dr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HATCH. You have a great supporter in me, and I have to say that I believe you did a really good job in the position we are talking about here today. I just have a few questions to ask, but I think they are important questions.

I might point out that the chart over to the right demonstrates the need for drug treatment for nonviolent drug offenders. There is a huge number of nonviolent drug offenders who aren't getting any help whatsoever and I do support consideration for such a proposal. But the Democrats' crime bill permits violent offenders to benefit from these alternative sanctions and we clearly don't have the money to even do it for the nonviolent offenders. We ought to start with those people first, it seems to me, at least to the extent of our money.

Mr. BENNETT. Absolutely.

Senator HATCH. If we can get to the others, I am all for it, but right now we don't have money for either of them. Now, do you believe that violent offenders should be permitted to participate in residential treatment programs and other alternative sanctions?

Mr. BENNETT. I agree with your sense of the priorities.

Senator HATCH. OK. When you began your assignment as the first Director of National Drug Control Policy, you had a small staff. As I recall, it was around 40.

Mr. BENNETT. Right.

Senator HATCH. You were able to accomplish a great deal. The staff needs, however, grew substantially as you served in this position and accomplished the things that you did and over time. Do you believe the job can be done today with 25 people, or even 40?

Mr. BENNETT. No. When Lee Brown came to visit me—and we had a couple of good conversations, Senator, before his confirmation, and indeed after his confirmation—I told him that if the administration's proposals for reductions went through, he would be

doing his own typing and xeroxing and delivering his own messages.

You see the strategy here today, this interim strategy that talks, for example, about more money for treatment, but then you see the interim budget and it is not there. I suggested only half facetiously that maybe Lee didn't have time to do the typing and get the xeroxing done. I don't know how the man can possibly do this with 25 people.

You remember one of the main responsibilities of the director of this office is to read through the budgets of all the other departments and decide whether to certify or not. These are extremely complicated documents. You need experts and specialists. You can't do this with 25 people.

Senator HATCH. As a Senator, I can't get the constituent services done for my constituents in Utah with 25 people. You just have got to have more people to do it, and we are talking about a nationwide war on drugs.

Mr. BENNETT. Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH. How would you assess the Clinton administration's war on drugs so far?

Mr. BENNETT. Well, it is not there; it is a no-show. There's is no "there" there. The lack of interest on the part of this administration in this issue is self-evident and shameful.

Senator HATCH. Is the drug problem we face part of a larger cultural problem? You have been doing some really interesting work in this area. You have indicated that we need our churches, our schools, et cetera, to help with this war. If it is part of a larger cultural problem, what should government, or the Federal Government to be more specific, be doing about it?

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I think the things that you talked about this morning are the things that we have been talking about for several years. I mean, there is a lot of consensus, and I would expect that you would agree there is a lot more consensus between you and Senator Biden or you and Senator Feinstein than, let us say, those people who favor legalization of drugs or other bizarre notions.

It is about treatment, it is about education, it is about prevention, it is about interdiction, it is about law enforcement. But in the sense that Senator Biden and I started to talk about before, it is also about social decomposition. We look at where the drug problem is the worst and it is the worst in those areas where those institutions, those character-forming institutions, are in the worst shape.

I think there is a religious dimension to this problem which isn't talked about. I learned this by going through drug treatment centers—not through drug treatment centers, to drug treatment centers—and going to a lot of drug treatment centers and asking people who were going through drug treatment what was going on with drugs. It just struck me how many times people said that, for them, crack or cocaine, or whatever it was we were talking about, provided meaning, a sense of transcendence, a sense that they were lifted out of their ordinary, miserable existence and taken to some higher plain.

This reminded you that the human search for meaning endures; it is everywhere. But, you know, this is looking in the wrong place. This is not the way to go, but it tells us that our other institutions

need to be better. Drugs, it seems to me, are in some people's lives the way religion should be in the same way that gangs are to some groups of young boys what the Boy Scouts should be. The former is the corrupt and malevolent version of the latter.

People will tell you who take crack cocaine—they say you feel like superman. You know, you feel transcendent, you feel great, you feel terrific, and then you crash. But when people talk about it, it is often spoken of in this almost religious language, except it is a counterfeit product. There is not much the Government can do about that. I mean, I don't think we need a department of religion or a department of counterfeit religion, but it tells us one of the dimensions of the problem.

Senator HATCH. Maybe we need to get government off the backs of religion. We seem to think that it is almost anathema to anything Government does.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I think the one thing we need to make clear to churches is that they have jobs and responsibilities which no government can provide. We need to make clear to families that government cannot raise children, and that is still the single most important responsibility of any person.

Senator HATCH. This Friday, we will be bringing to the floor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which we think will resolve some of the Governmental-vis-a-vis-religion problems that we have in our society. It is only a step, but it does reconstruct religion where it should be, and that is the first protected freedom in the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights.

Mr. BENNETT. There is a lot of bigotry against religion. I was saying the other day the last "respectable" form of bigotry in this country is bigotry against people who practice religion. I know people who think that a much greater threat to society and social order comes not from drug dealers and murderers and rapists and car-jackers, but they are really much more exercised about people who would like to see a return of prayer to public places. They think that is a more serious problem in America than what we are looking at today.

Senator HATCH. What would you do—I know this is kind of a generic question, but what would you do to help bring about these cultural changes that really would make society more stable and perhaps give incentives to some of our young people to stay out of the world of drugs?

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I think there is a ton of things. I mean, you know, we were talking about the nuts and bolts of government this morning, treatment programs and law enforcement and appropriate things for government to do. But what you want, of course, is those stronger social institutions. I think they begin with families and schools and churches. As to the churches, I am not sure the Government should do anything. As to schools, you know, Senator, I have long believed that we need many more alternatives for children and for parents now than they are getting.

I am involved in this very contentious debate in California on school choice. I think there should not only be school choice for parents, because I think it is important, but I think there has to be probably the residential alternative for children in some settings. There just isn't much point in talking about this program or that

if you are sitting in certain neighborhoods in Los Angeles without a father and virtually no mother. The streets are run by the Bloods and the Crips. Your cultural diet is MTV and "Beavis and Butt-Head." You know, the odds of success for such children are not very, very great.

The generators of all this, or one of the generators, the out-of-wedlock pregnancy rate, continues to climb quite dramatically. So, you know, we can keep thinking of ways to pull kids out of the maelstrom, to pull them out of the flooding river, but we have got to look upstream to what is throwing them into the river. We probably need to look at divorce laws. We probably need to look at education provisions. We certainly need to look at deadbeat dads, and we need to look at a whole array of other things.

Senator HATCH. One last question because my time is just about up. Could you tell us about any success stories from the trenches in the drug war that might help us to assess drug strategy proposals?

Mr. BENNETT. Yes, sir. There are successes, and when people say how are we doing in the drug war, part of the answer has to be it all depends where we are looking at it. There have been some tremendous successes. I think, in the interests of time, I would just suggest anybody who is interested in seeing how to fight drugs should go to Charleston, SC, and take a look at what Reuben Greenberg did there. Reuben Greenberg is the black orthodox Jew police chief of Charleston, SC—only in America, you know. He has brought the crime and drug rate of that city down from what it was to the level of the early 1950's.

The residents of Charleston will tell you the most serious problems that they complain to the chief about now have to do with noise from the fraternity parties—no drive-bys, no car-jackings. This is the good old days in Charleston. Even the lieutenant governor of North Carolina has praised it. Now, when the lieutenant governor of North Carolina praises something going on in South Carolina, you know it is really happening, it is really true.

They said, well, is it replicable, so they brought Greenberg to Mobile, AL, and he did the same thing. He got his cops out from behind the desks, out into the street. He went to public housing and he said we are going to start there. He got a compact with the people in public housing. He will protect them, but they cannot house drug dealers, they cannot use drugs, a whole set of things, and they got tremendous success. That is something worth looking at.

I think Operation Cul-de-Sac in Los Angeles was a very successful program. This is where they took the high drug use area—with the permission of the residents in that area, they cordoned it off and only let residents of the area drive through. Nobody who wasn't a resident could drive through unless they were invited. The residents of the area gave their permission. Drive-bys went down dramatically, drug use went down dramatically. It was very interesting to me that high school attendance went up by 250 kids in that area. It turns out a lot of people were not sending their children to school because they didn't think they were safe and they had to run a gauntlet of drug dealers along the way.

Lee Brown's program in New York, TNT, was discontinued, but I think that was a successful program. There are some other exam-

ples in Tulsa and Tampa and other places we have looked at that have been successful. You can make progress against this monster and there are communities in this country that have done it.

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. I really appreciate your appearing before the committee.

Mr. BENNETT. Yes, sir, Senator, thank you.

Senator HATCH. I appreciate your service and I appreciate what you are trying to do now.

I will yield the floor.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I am pleased to have this opportunity because I think you did a very good job. I agree with Senator Hatch, and I think you brought drug use to a real consciousness in the eyes of the American public.

Let me ask you this question, Mr. Bennett. What do you think was the most successful thing that you did?

Mr. BENNETT. I don't know; I think probably making a whole lot of noise about it that was relatively coherent noise, stomping around the country, going to 105 different cities and just trying to get as much attention for this issue and this problem as possible, and as often as possible having the President with me. I think that was a great thing.

I think that we were able to coordinate an effort. We got a lot more money for the drug problem, but I think, you know, essentially the main job of the drug czar is to keep the heat on, keep the attention of the American people. The Federal Government isn't going to solve this problem, but as they say about politics, they may not control how the debate goes, but you can set some of the terms of debate. You can decide what people are focusing on, and that is a function of—there is a great line from "Death of a Salesman" where Linda Loman says of her dead husband to her son, attention must be paid to people, attention must be paid.

I think the most important thing the drug czar does is keeps attention on it because when this problem is solved, when it has been solved or when it has been improved, Senator, it has been improved by the Reuben Greenbergs or the Drew Davises or the people that we might cite—local people, teachers, priests, community leaders, people running public housing projects, police chiefs. That is where it is going to be settled and resolved.

Senator FEINSTEIN. I happen to agree with you about the family. Actually, if you follow the present trend lines, by the year 2000 40 percent of all of the 14-year-olds today will have been pregnant and given birth before the age of 20. So it is a tremendous phenomenon out there that we have got to address.

Mr. BENNETT. Right.

Senator FEINSTEIN. One of the things that I have been surprised at is the absence of willingness of churches to really get involved. Whether it is that they don't want to admit that part of their parish relates to it or what, I don't know. I am wondering if you know of any good examples—I know of a couple, one of them being Gallide Memorial Church in San Francisco where they have a major crack program with 500 crack addicts. They actually house them and feed them and spend all of the time with them, but there are very few churches like that one.

Mr. BENNETT. It is a great opportunity for churches. I was quite surprised to see that there weren't more churches on top of this issue and throwing themselves into it. There have been some that are notable. There was an effort made here in Washington, DC, and still some effort is being made in some of the churches, but not as much as should be.

One of the things that we tried to stress to churches is that effective treatment programs can be started and run quite effectively in the basements of churches. You don't need to have a Covenant House or a Phoenix House to run an effective treatment program. An awful lot of people go through treatment in the basement of a church if the churches will go to the trouble of doing it.

I think that some of the churches felt this was not in their, "jurisdiction" because they thought it was a different kind of problem. They thought it was a medical problem. As I have suggested, it is a problem with a lot of dimensions, but one of the most important ones is religious and spiritual. I think if the churches got on this more and we cited examples of successes of the churches, we would see more positive results. I agree with you.

Senator FEINSTEIN. If you were writing this plan today, what would be its three major tenets?

Mr. BENNETT. I agree with Senator Biden. I would say, look, we have made some real progress on casual drug use, but to lay down our oars on that one. I don't know if you saw the story in the Washington Post a few days ago about how 2½ years ago in Washington, DC, when they tested the arrestees for drug use, 10 percent of them tested positive. According to the Post story, this year 55 percent are testing positive. That is a big shoot up, and a lot of these are young people.

The kids reported on in this story said, well, you know, we are not going to use cocaine because that is dangerous, but marijuana is something else. It is true enough that the kids are the easiest to deter, the easiest to slow down early on in this process, but they are also the ones who will jump back the quickest to drug use if you don't keep the pressure on. So you have got to keep the pressure on in the schools and through the messages.

But that aside, yes, hard-core drug use has got to be where you aim your resources and your efforts. The first thing I would do is say—this is something the President of the United States should say, it seems to me—we cannot tolerate a situation in this country where some neighborhoods are relatively safe and secure and other neighborhoods have open-air drug markets, just open-air drug markets. Everybody knows they are there and everybody can go to them. I am making that my number one priority. This would be an act of faithfulness to the citizens of those communities, but I think it would also make a big difference.

Put these people out of business and then go on to the drug court and punishment versus treatment alternatives, attack hard-core drug use where it is, which is for the most part—if you targeted the 15 or 20 largest cities in this country in this way, I think you could have a profound effect.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Actually, the Super Collider may not take place now, with the House defunding it. If we could just take that money and designate it toward the abolition of hard-core drug use

in this country and the elimination of the open-air centers, the crack houses, a major inner-city effort to get at drug abuse, I think we might be able to make some inroads.

Mr. BENNETT. You know, the other thing I would mention, Senator—yes, I agree. The other thing I would mention is one thing that I think is very important for members of this committee, the chairman, the President and others to point out. We hear incessantly on the news about how much it costs to put someone in prison. We have to make clear to the American people how much it costs to keep someone out of prison—if you have a guy out there selling drugs, what it costs society not to have that person behind bars. It is a lot more than what it costs to keep the person in prison.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you very much.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HATCH [PRESIDING]. Senator Grassley?

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF IOWA**

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Dr. Bennett. It is good to see you.

Mr. BENNETT. It is good to see you.

Senator GRASSLEY. What can you tell us about the use of marijuana among young people? Is it on the increase or has it leveled off?

Mr. BENNETT. It seems to be we have slowed down on our domestic eradication—not as much lately in domestic eradication, and that has been a problem, and also I think the message. You know, the combination of messages from the Federal Government, from advertising, and from others on cocaine and crack has penetrated. I think that is true. You can't come across anybody who hasn't gotten the message on crack and cocaine, but marijuana is still regarded rather benignly in lots of quarters.

Senator GRASSLEY. There are a lot of people involved with a long-term look at the war on drugs, particularly now with the new administration, but not only the new administration who say that there is too much emphasis upon law enforcement. What is your view on that—money and resources being spent on law enforcement as opposed to education, drug rehabilitation, et cetera?

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I don't share that, as you know. I think sometimes the money is counted in a different way, but, you know, it depends on what things cost. If you are going to use AWACS and you are going to use Defense Department equipment to scan the horizon and to look over the Caribbean to see if the guys are coming through with their boats, that is going to cost you money. That is going to cost you more money than a school policy, Senator, in Des Moines that says at this school you will not use drugs; if you do, you will be expelled. That doesn't cost anything, but it is probably very effective. You don't measure either the importance of a measure or your commitment to its importance by how much money you spend. Some things cost more than other things.

But I would remind people again and again there is a reason that most people are in treatment, and the reason that most people are in treatment is they were caught by somebody and sent to treatment. This is not Jenny Craig. This is not Diet Center. People

are in treatment because the cops got them or their wife said, if you don't get clean, I am going to divorce you, or their employer said, get clean or you have lost your job. Compulsion remains a very important feature of drug treatment. I would remind you of the former mayor of Washington, DC, who did see the light of treatment, but he did not see the light until he saw the law.

Senator GRASSLEY. When you became director of our drug policy, you made very clear that you thought the war on drugs was winnable, and that was directly related to why the position should not be Cabinet status. Has the elevation of the drug czar's position to this level suggested that we do indeed have a permanent drug problem?

Mr. BENNETT. Listen, I have to tell you, Senator, in candor, I think the elevation of Lee Brown to not just Cabinet level, but sitting at the table—I was Cabinet level; I just wasn't sitting at the table. Big deal. It means nothing whether you are sitting at the table or not. The question is when you call the President, does he answer the phone, and if you ask him to come somewhere or help out, does he come and does he give a darn about it. Is he there?

Not very far into our administration, we were on our way to Cartagena. George Bush and I were in Houston at Acres Homes and a number of places. You remember the visit to Des Moines, the visits of the President to Kansas City. He was there and seen to be there.

I interpret this putting Lee Brown at the Cabinet table as a cynical move. It is sort of like this: we will put him at the Cabinet table, we will strip his staff. He won't have any staff to work with anymore. We are going to pay no attention to this issue, for whatever reason they have decided that, but we will say he is a full-fledged member of the Cabinet and maybe people will buy it. We will also say along the line we are going to dramatically cut White House staff to show that we are committed to small Government and take all of that cut essentially out of the drug office. I interpret this cynically.

It doesn't matter whether you sit at the table or don't sit at the table. What matters is whether, inside the administration, you are going to have some degree of clout, and one way to measure that is how many times does the President talk about what it is you are doing. Is there any doubt in this administration that Janet Reno has clout? There is not much doubt. We can tell by the way the President talks about her, the kind of deference to her, the fact that she can contradict Vice Presidents on various issues. This person has power. Would that Lee Brown had some of that. So I can't interpret it anything but cynically.

In terms of success, I would say this. Remember where we were when Senator Biden and I began this symposium years ago. What people were saying is this thing is spiraling out of control; there is no way to get the numbers down. The numbers are going to get bigger and bigger and bigger. Half the population is going to be on drugs; there is no way to stop it. The pressure for legalization was quite intense.

We have now as a country sorted this out into two problems, and one problem is really getting a lot better. There is no doubt about

it. The other problem isn't, and so that is why I think the Senator is right to focus on that one.

If you had taken two other problems, teenage pregnancy and AIDS, just to take two other very serious problems, and had made the kind of progress this country has made on half of each of those in the way that we have made it on this, I think people would think it quite successful.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, and I am not being gratuitous when I say this, it is always a pleasure to have you. I quite frankly hope for as clear a voice on this issue. You and I both took heat when we were working together, you for not jumping all over me, and me for saying good things about you. But the fact of the matter is that I say now what I said then that we need a forceful voice. You provided that voice.

I have made it clear—as a matter of fact, the reason I left the room is I was talking to a high White House official on another matter relating to the crime legislation and made it clear to him what I will say publicly again. This administration must intensify its focus and demonstrate its commitment to dealing with the drug problem.

As I pointed out to this particular individual who was calling me about crime and wanting to do more in the crime bill, there is a movement afoot here. One of the things that has changed is there is real pace on this ball right now. When I went to the caucus, and my Republican colleagues, I expect, went to their caucus 4 months ago on crime, they said, "Where are we going to get the money?" Now, the caucuses—and I know you know, but so people know, the caucuses are the meetings of all the Democratic Senators and all the Republican Senators. They are now saying, gee, we have got to get more money, we have got to do it. The administration is there as well.

The point I made, and everyone should understand, and you do, is there is no bright line between dealing with crime and dealing with drugs. So to suggest that we can get tougher on crime and forget about drugs is totally inconsistent. So I am hopeful and I am confident your presence here today will help focus attention. I am confident that the constructive criticism of my friend from Utah will focus the attention of the White House, and I hope to some extent my suggesting that I will keep my powder dry for a little while longer and hold my fire may get their attention. But it must be gotten because we cannot let this thing drift for another 2 years.

I thank you very, very much and I hope you will be willing to come back, and I know you are always willing to give us your counsel.

Mr. BENNETT. I sure will. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks again.

Mr. BENNETT. Thanks very much.

The CHAIRMAN. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



